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May 26, 2012
 
 
 
 
 
 

What does the military’s surprise visit mean?
by
İRFAN YILDIRIM*

5 September 2008 / ,
The Ergenekon case is still shaking Turkey. Most recently, the visit paid on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) by Kocaeli Garrison Commander Lt. Gen. Galip Mendi to retired generals Şener Eruygur and Hurşit Tolon, who are being held in Kandıra Prison in connection with the case, has added a new dimension to the issue.
The visit, paid shortly after the change of command at the TSK on Aug. 30, raised questions as to whether a new era would start in relations between the military and the civilian authorities and whether the army had broken the consensus in regard to the Ergenekon case. Worth noting are recent remarks by Air Forces Commander Gen. Aydoğan Babaoğlu, who, in response to news reports alleging that the military initiated its own operation against Ergenekon’s branches within the military and to a question about an arrested military officer, said, “What Ergenekon is, is not clear,” adding that the arrest was not related to Ergenekon. The recent visit should be taken into account together with this statement and the change in the army’s command line.

The military has been influential over Turkish politics for a long time. The form of its interference in the political process is changing; but the core reality remains. The army’s interference with politics injures not only the political process, but also the institutional identity of the military. For this reason, the army is looking for a formula that will restrain this interference and not erode its image. Lessons are taken from each intervention, whereas every new intervention and freshly invented formula causes additional injuries. One primary goal of the army in all these interventions is to protect its autonomous position vis-à-vis politics. Secondly, it seeks to prevent divisions within the army. The fundamental goal has been the preservation of army’s integrity since the promulgation of the second constitutional monarchy. Divisions within the army lead to the emergence of pro-junta groups, further creating disruptive effects over the army’s hierarchy and traditions. The junta that emerged separately from the army’s chain of command during the May 27, 1960 coup created a certain tendency toward junta formation that lasted through the 1980s. It could even be said that the primary goal of the military intervention on March 12, 1971 was to reinstitute the hierarchy within the army.

Sept. 12 coup

In an attempt to ensure that there would be no need for military coups in the future, the Sept. 12, 1980 coup, staged within the chain of command, found a formula by which it could legalize the move through the mechanism of the National Security Council (MGK). However, as observed in the Feb. 28, 1997 process, this formula was still disruptive to the army’s hierarchy. Besides, the MGK, which was subjected to an institutional reformation in connection with Turkey’s EU bid, was no longer a tool for the military’s intervention. As such, those who seek military interference in politics are looking for new methods and means.

To this end, references were made to the inconsistencies between the army’s priorities in regard to laicism, the nation-state and state unity and democratization, globalization and EU reforms. During Gen. Hilmi Özkök’s term as chief of general staff, coup attempts involving such prominent names as Aytaç Yalman and Şener Eruygur failed because the junta within the army and its collaborators were unable to provoke the army, which wanted to restore its image after its erosion during the Feb. 28 process. Combined with the assignment of military officers who were able to integrate with globalization and democratization to military posts during Özkök’s term, the sphere of military intervention was significantly narrowed. However, the presidential election revived the concerns over a possible division led by pro-intervention actors. This revival led to the issuance of a memorandum on April 27. However, supporters of a strong reaction and harsh measures lost impact and strength after the July 22 elections and the referendum held on Oct. 21. Relations between the army and the civilian authority further improved and normalized when the activities of pro-junta groups in the Ergenekon organization became apparent. However, the new command that assumed duty on Aug. 30 set a strong block before the parties asking for harsh measures. It was subsequently held that this might disrupt the hierarchy of the army and that the army should demonstrate its eagerness to preserve its autonomy vis-à-vis politics. This is the reason the recent visit was held on behalf of the TSK.

Through the speeches made at the handover ceremonies and the recent visit, the army stressed that civilian authorities would not be allowed to interfere with the army’s internal disputes. At the same time, the military underlined that the Ergenekon case should be limited to “Ergenekon minor” and not involve the “Grand Ergenekon,” which may extend to the army. But, of course, this visit does not necessarily mean that those who disrupted the army hierarchy will not be punished. While it is a large and clumsy institution unable to transform rapidly, the army should rely on these recent moves to save time and slow retreat. Otherwise, the harm associated with these latest two moves will be beyond imagination.


*Dr. İrfan Yıldırım is a political scientist.
 
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