My main point was and is that the current political leadership in Turkey is giving voice to the deeper changes taking place in Turkish society rather than forcing it.This is not to deny the impact personalities have on a country’s policies. Just as we cannot deny the “Özal impact” in the 1980s, we cannot analyze the successes and failures of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government without paying due attention to its leaders and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in particular. The “Erdoğan impact” is clearly to be seen in every facet of Turkish politics today. Erdoğan, who is not a diplomat but a political leader, passionately believes in such values as justice, trust, honesty and sincerity. None of these core values have a proper place in the current nomenclature of political science and/or international relations. They are the “subjective” and sentimental elements of global politics. This much of Erdoğan’s political leadership can be analyzed along subjective tendencies. But there is more to the new Turkey that is emerging than personality politics.
Andrew Finkel, one of the astute observers of Turkey and a columnist in this paper, responded to my piece by pointing to the complexities of the new Turkey I speak of. The sharp contrast between the old and new Turkey may not be as sharp after all, he implied. “There may well be a legion of yesterday’s men who want to see Turkey turn the clock back to the crusty certainties of the Cold War. But there are also those who suspect, more in sorrow than in anger, that the ‘new Turkey’ is not quite as innovative as it pretends,” Finkel concluded.
I don’t know how one measures being “innovative,” but the sharp contrast between the old and new Turkey requires no comment. Admitting this fact does not commit us to political Manichaeism. Nor does it make us blind to the complexities and subtleties of the new Turkey. No single actor or factor can sufficiently explain this new era. Even the AK Party, which for the last eight years has played a vital role in steering Turkey into this new period, is only part of the story.
The new story in short: Turkey is responding to its own new realities and the world around it. Turkey’s economic interests and energy needs are a major reason for its increasing trade partnership with Russia and Iran. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) threat to Turkey’s eastern and southern borders has forced all political actors to seek better relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran. Turkey’s internal debates about issues of identity, the Kurdish issue, military coups, the rule of law and the fight against illegal organizations and deep state structures naturally make EU membership a top priority for Turkey’s democrats. Turkey’s search for new opportunities in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other parts of the world should also be seen within the context of its efforts to recalibrate its hard and soft power and position itself as a central mid-size power.
Critics usually refer to Iran, Israel, Armenia and Cyprus as areas of trouble for Turkey’s new foreign policy. It is true that none of these issues, and others such as Darfur, are as easy as they seem. It is because of their complexity that they require a lot of patience, political capital, diplomatic skill and, I repeat, a longer view of history. Turkey could have done nothing about the Iranian nuclear issue. Would that have made the Iran file any better? Despite the publicly dismissive attitude of the Americans, the May 17 Tehran Declaration is still seen by Americans and Europeans as an important achievement. As a result of Turkish efforts, the Iranians have agreed to resume talks with the Vienna Group and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September.
Turkey may not have initiated and supported the process of normalization with Armenia. Would that have made the situation in the Caucasus any better? Is it only Turkey’s fault that the protocols have not been implemented? Have the Armenians taken any steps to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue? Or begin to discuss the events of 1915-16 in a different way? On Cyprus, what else do the critics expect Turkey to do? Surrender completely to the short-sighted vision of the Greek Cypriots and reward the Europeans for failing to unite the island?
And finally a word on Israel. Who is really responsible for the current tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv? Have we already forgotten how Ehud Olmert misled Prime Minister Erdoğan and started the war on Gaza only four days after he left Ankara in 2008? Ankara repeatedly tried to reach out to Tel Aviv to resume the Syrian-Israeli talks over the last year and a half. Who has been in complete silence about these calls?
Regarding the Gaza aid flotilla, is Turkey supposed to keep silent and do nothing about the killing of nine Turks because no one is willing to confront Israel? As Roger Cohen asks in his New York Times column “The Forgotten American” about Furkan Doğan, the 19-year old American citizen of Turkish origin who was killed by Israeli commandos on the Mavi Marmara, should we do nothing about this and act like the Americans who expressed sorrow but did not even ask the Israelis how a US citizen was killed by five bullets at close-range while holding a camera in his hand? Despite harsh criticism by everyone, from US President Barack Obama and most recently British Prime Minister David Cameron, who was in Ankara a few days ago, should the Netanyahu government be placated for its consistent efforts to botch the peace process, undermine Mahmoud Abbas’ authority and turn Gaza into a “prison camp,” to use Cameron’s metaphor?
Raising these questions is seen as a failure. And I ask myself if the word “failure” has lost its meaning in English.
