According to some, the Ergenekon investigation is the panacea to correct all the wrongdoings of the deep state, whereas some others allege that this case was just a fabrication of this government and a pretext to weaken the secular system in Turkey.While this lively debate continued in Turkey, there was also parallel coverage of the case in the Western media. Unlike the discussion in Turkey, foreign coverage of the case was predominantly in favor of the second view in Turkey: Islamists are trying to bring down the secular system, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is trying to get revenge on the military through this case and so on. To support their thesis, these pro-Ergenekon publications also tried to convince Western audiences that the Ergenekon case was only supported by Islamists and the government.
As the Human Rights Agenda Association and the Young Civilians, we wanted to examine the arguments used in these pro-Ergenekon publications and we wished to see “what were the common denominators” on the viewpoints of Turkish intellectuals and democrats on the Ergenekon case.
As a first step, we had scanned all Western media to identify the arguments against the Ergenekon case. We formulated all these arguments as 10 main claims and 24 sub-questions. We invited people from all parts of the political spectrum to take part in the workshop, focusing on two conditions only: a familiarity with the Ergenekon case and a good record of respect for human rights. In the two-day workshop that we held in İstanbul on April 10-11, almost 40 participants attended our program. On the first day intellectuals, journalists and human rights defenders and on the second day well-known human rights lawyers were amongst the participants of the workshops.
These groups were divided into subgroups, and each subgroup was given a couple of claims and sub-questions to have an in-depth discussion over in line with their fields of expertise. On return, all these subgroups presented their conclusions in the plenary session so that the entire group could discuss and examine each argument raised during the sub-group discussions.
Using the transcripts of these discussions, we prepared a draft report and sent it to all participants to get their approval and amended the first draft according to the proposals of the participants. We finalized the report and called it “Ergenekon Is Our Reality” because we got the impression that this title was the most appropriate one to reflect the mood of the participants.
What were the claims and how did the participants evaluate them?
The first claim is the one that is used to deal a deadly blow to the whole Ergenekon trial: “Ergenekon does not exist.” According to some pro-Ergenekon circles, there is no evidence in the court file showing that there is such an organization like Ergenekon. In my opinion, being able to cast doubt on the very existence of the organization has been the biggest achievement so far. According to participants in the workshops, Ergenekon exists and its existence was not a secret before the launch of the investigation. Ergenekon is what the organization calls itself. The important documents pointing to the existence of the organization are included in the Ergenekon case file. During the investigation so many documents were seized in the domiciles and business places of the suspects and from various other sources.
One of those documents, titled “Ergenekon, Analysis Project of Restructuring, Management and Development,” consisting of 25 pages, explained the objectives and methods of the organization.
Six indictments have been prepared thus far as part of the ongoing probe. The indictments are basically based on two issues. The first one concerns the organization itself, while the second one is focused on coup and action plans. Some of the coup and action plans are directly linked to Ergenekon, while others are, however, being investigated without any reference to the shadowy organization.
According to indictments, the organization, to prepare a fertile ground for a new coup, launched or planned 15 violent incidents, including but not limited to, the Council of State shootings; hand grenade attacks on the Cumhuriyet daily headquarters; assassination plans for Diyarbakir Mayor Osman Baydmir, the Armenian patriarch, Alevi leaders and so on.
The indictments analyze in detail the fragmental structure of the Ergenekon network. You can have a look at the Gladio investigation in Italy to form an idea about the Ergenekon probe.
On Nov. 22, 1990, the European Parliament called on all European countries to expose the Gladio-linked formations within their borders. The only NATO member country that has failed to do so is Turkey.
Is Ergenekon a political case?
Another claim that we brought before the participants is whether Ergenekon is a political case, as is claimed by some circles. The proponents of this thesis claim that the government was long aware of both the existence and the activities of Ergenekon but that it just introduced the case in 2007 for political purposes. The participants first reminded listeners of what happened to two former public prosecutors (Ferhat Sarıkaya and Sacit Kayasu) when they tried to initiate cases against soldiers and against the 1980 military coup. These two prosecutors were removed from duty and were condemned to a kind of “civil death.”
The participants also stated that prosecutors were unable to even interrogate suspects in crimes related to the deep state until the launch of the Ergenekon case. In addition, had the government been aware of the coup plan in 2002, it would not have been able to initiate legal action against it because neither sufficient political power nor an adequate amount of evidence existed for such an action.
Finally, when we asked the participants whether this case was only supported by the government and so-called Islamists, the participants stated that the case had quite a broad support base in Turkey, including liberals, leftists, non-Muslims, devout Muslims, Kurds, Alevis, in short, everyone who comes together in their support for a stronger democracy and rule of law and who have seen themselves as potential victims of the deep state. Actually the various backgrounds and identities of the participants were sufficient proof for their assessment. And participants commented on the government’s support for this case: “What could be more ordinary than Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan’s support for a criminal case against an organization that planned to overthrow his government?”
I will continue to discuss the findings of the report, the full text of which can be found at http://www.ergenekonisourreality.wordpress.com.
