Democracy has proven to be better than most other regimes. The vast majority of the world’s population sees it as a system of stability and prosperity. And they are right in thinking so. The problem is that democracy in a geopolitical context means different things.Take the example of Turkey. Europeans and Americans see Turkey as a good model because it is a Muslim-majority country ruled by a secular democracy. Given the absence of democracy in most Muslim countries, they look at Turkey as a good example for other Muslim nations to follow. This is further underlined by Turkey’s strategic alliance with the West, a position Turkey has taken since the first days of its modernizations and formalized in 1952 when Turkey became the first and only Muslim member of NATO. Turkey is still holding on to this position with its efforts to join the European Union as a full member.
Arabs see Turkey as a good model because they see in it a powerful country that can be prosperous economically and self-confident, even independent in its foreign policy but still on good terms with the West. They appreciate Turkey’s democracy despite its shortcomings and bumpy history. They see a synthesis of tradition and modernity in Turkey. And finally, they hail Turkey’s dynamic foreign policy as a sign of better things to come.
Both versions have some truth to them but not all. Westerners have a reason to be keen on Turkey’s experience of Islam and democracy because they see democracy as key for the stability and prosperity of Muslim countries, which, in turn, serves their strategic interests. But they are wrong to think, as Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis did, that the absence of democracy and democratic institutions in Muslim countries is a result of the religion of Islam and/or Muslim culture. The reason is not the supposed clash between the essential values of Islam and democracy. This issue has been largely resolved in the Muslim world since over a century ago. The anti-democracy stance of a few marginal and extremist groups does not speak for the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims.
Rather, the reason is the oppressive political systems that do not allow the flourishing of democracy in Muslim countries. Paradoxically, it is the same Western powers, which see their strategic interest in the development and spread of democracy, that support oppressive regimes in the Muslim world. They are too afraid to let democracy reign because of their fear of the “Islamists” taking over. But their fear of the so-called Islamists is not due to their alleged antidemocratic attitude (many of them endorse some form of democracy anyway) but to their potential of being critical of Western policies.
Islamists or other political movements can be antidemocratic and anti-Western. But the two are not the same. A democratic country can very well be critical of Western policies, and this takes nothing away from its democratic credentials. The problem is that Western countries prefer to work with antidemocratic, pro-Western regimes. This is where the standards of Western democracy falter.
Coming back to Turkey, the struggle here is not between Islam and democracy but between those who want reform and those who defend the status quo. The real debate is not between the so-called Islamists and secularists but between reformists and the establishment. The middle ground is democracy embraced by all Turks. But it is a democracy that is also at peace with the history and culture of Turkey. Turks see no contradiction between democracy, the rule of law and transparency, on the one hand, and their religious and societal values, on the other. But they do object to rampant Westernization and anti-religious laicism. This is where the Arab and Muslim world sees Turkey as a model: a country in the balance that embraces democratic values but rejects the excesses of the modern consumerist and neo-imperialist policies of the West.
Can the West accept such a model of democracy for Muslim nations? This is the question whose answer will shape the political landscape in the Muslim world.
