The government should be applauded for its courageous steps, by Turkish standards, in taking a determined stance to settle its score with coup planners regardless of their rank within the once-untouchable TSK. Unfortunately, it has not been courageous enough in the introduction of legal measures to ensure that the military will not dare to stage or plan coups, intervening in the political process in this country. The TSK headquarters, which has badly tarnished its own image by either knowingly or unknowingly allowing some of its members to be involved in unconstitutional acts, such as triggering armed unrest to unseat the government, does not appear to have learned adequate lessons.
One supporting piece of evidence is a suggestion the TSK made through a professor that it wishes to conform to a Cold War model in the 21st century. In the meantime, I should emphasize that the duty of ensuring the democratic civilian control of the armed forces falls under the responsibility of the political authorities. In other words, it is not the military’s responsibility to offer and dictate a model for itself, although the views of uniformed men should be taken into consideration provided that they fall in line with the standards of democratic civilian control.
Professor Metin Heper of Ankara-based Bilkent University suggested, quoting Turkish Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, a model for the TSK that recalls, however, the army model of the Cold War era (Professor Metin Heper, Star Açık Görüş supplement, March 7). The supplement describes Professor Heper as one of the academics that Gen. Başbuğ uses as a reference, but the whole article itself gives the strong impression that it was actually written by the top commander himself.
“The reason that lies behind Gen. Başbuğ’s opinion that in military-civilian relations the last word lies with civilians is his linkage to the opinion of objective control but not subjective control of the armed forces. … Objective control envisages a professional army fulfilling its duties well enough while trying to stay out of politics,” says Professor Heper.
In his book “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,” published in 1957, political scientist Samuel P. Huntington advances the theory of objective civilian control, according to which the optimal means of asserting control over the armed forces is to professionalize them. This is in contrast with subjective control, which involves placing legal and institutional restrictions on the military’s autonomy. Gen. Başbuğ’s model is based on Huntington’s objective control theory written 53 years ago, falling short of reflecting a model that fits 21st century armies whose democratic civilian control is ensured.
Let’s take Chile as an example. The Chilean army, like all other armies in Latin America before they were fully taken under the democratic civilian control of the political authorities, was highly professional. But this did not prevent them from being brutal and acting like a war machine.
Therefore, Gen. Başbuğ’s model suggested for the TSK cannot be applicable in today’s world, where democratic civilian control of the army, but not “Civilian control,” as suggested by Huntington 53 years ago, is valid. Therefore, in today’s world, there needs to be societal democratic civilian control over the armed forces so that democracy can function fully.
I suggest that Professor Heper carefully read at least two security almanacs published by the İstanbul-based Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), if not other international literature on the models required for armed forces.
