In a world where “reconciliation plans” are less attractive than “genocide claims,” public outreach is of vital importance for a country like Turkey to “speak in tongues” of the nations of the world. Turkey has been passing through parallel processes of change. “Opening” -- the meaning of a new opening, a new initiative -- became a buzzword in contemporary Turkish politics. Democratic opening, Armenian opening, Syrian opening, Alevi opening, Cyprus opening are only a few reform initiatives Turkey is navigating, with different and changing levels of activism and importance. None of these are unrelated to Turkey’s EU membership attempt. None of these are unrelated to Turkey’s redefinition of itself. Plain logic suggests that these openings should be opening new doors before Turkey. They are not.Particularly Armenian-Turkish rapprochement should have been enthusiastically welcomed and endorsed in Western capitals. This rapprochement is to a certain extent a “made in Europe” project. We would expect the Swiss to start a discussion about their legally baseless “Armenian genocide denial law” that punishes any person who denies the Armenian genocide took place between 1915 and 1924. In the end, they encouraged and witnessed the Turkish and Armenian sides shaking hands on the formation of history commissions and stating that they would refrain from making any political or legal move before those commissions made a decision. They didn’t do that. Besides, American and Chilean politicians did the reverse. They undermined the raison d’être for the commissions to be created.
Yet Turkey was not able -- if not unwilling -- to explain to the world that embracing Resolution No. 252 would undermine one of the greatest peace efforts of our modern era. In the end Ankara decided to tell the Americans that such a move would undermine Turkish-US military and economic cooperation. Ankara recalled the Turkish ambassador to Washington and hinted that his stay in Ankara may be longer than one would expect if the resolution is voted on in Congress and passes.
This is not public diplomacy; this is traditional diplomacy. This is not the use of soft power; this is realpolitik. It may work in convincing American politicians to delay their votes in support of the resolution, but it won’t convince them that it is not their business to vote on a purely and exclusively legal and historical subject.
Public diplomacy is first of all a public phenomenon. It is about the public, publications, publicity and even pubs. It is about football; it is about tourism; it is about media; it is about TV series; it is about the civil society. It is, of course, about diplomacy, too. But it is not diplomatic diplomacy. It is intimate diplomacy. It is not a call from the red line; it is a call of the face.
Turkey has been discussing the need for a public diplomacy strategy for some time now. Today’s Zaman has been a champion of public diplomacy, both by means of encouraging the formulation of that strategy and by means of appealing to the global audience interested in what is going on in and around Turkey.
Finally, the long-awaited Public Diplomacy Coordination Agency [Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü] has been founded within the Office of the Prime Minister. This is an agency that will define itself while acting. We will be both an enthusiastic supporter and a critical inspector of the activities of “our diplomacy agency”… Aren’t we the public?!
