Who deserves criticism more: Prime minister or the media?

These protests were justified, yes, but was Prime Minister Erdoğan completely unfair with respect to his concerns about the media and columnists? I do not think so. The problem is not that Prime Minister Erdoğan has concerns about the problematic state of the press and the media, easily visible to everyone. Here, the problem is that Mr. Erdoğan wrongly adopted a style or wording that may have given the impression that he wants censorship. Of course, such a thing is unacceptable because when public officials who wield great power utter remarks that are likely to be understood as attempting to silence the press, this will naturally cause great damage to the country’s image. If Erdoğan is rightly concerned about the destructive role of some media organizations, the solution is not to complain about it or use a threatening style. It is to introduce healthy media ownership rules that conform to Western norms, to prevent the formation of monopolies in the media sector and to introduce legal arrangements that will create a suitable atmosphere for pluralistic, free and diversified media organizations so that such destructive effects can be prevented. Then, he should wait patiently for the dynamics of the media sector to operate, and a balance can be established on its own in this free atmosphere.

Seeing me criticize the prime minister about his comments, do not be fooled that I regard the Turkish media as free from any guilt. If the prime minister deserves to be criticized once, then the relics of the old media whose reactions are shaped by anti-democratic and militaristic sentiments deserve to be criticized 1,000 times. Particularly when you read about the sincere confessions from the former boss of the Sabah group, who was once a very powerful man, in a long interview conducted by Neşe Düzel of the Taraf daily, you may even consider the media’s criticisms hurled at Erdoğan a serious injustice to him. This interview that exposes the underworld of media-politics relations in the past, particularly during the Feb. 28 postmodern military process, is proof that the current state of these relations is much healthier.

Really, with his vast experience Dinç Bilgin makes eye-opening revelations about the relations between media bosses and politicians and generals, who the media bosses actually fear, the reasons for these fears, the role of the media in the Feb. 28 process, feeding papers with fabricated news stories, the power of the media in Turkey, their business ties with the government and whether journalism has changed in Turkey, and his remarks cast light on our recent past and on the role the media currently plays.

At the beginning of the interview Bilgin said: “In Turkey, prime ministers have always had complaints about papers, their owners and columnists. There is nothing new about these complaints or directions. What is new is that the current prime minister is much more straightforward. It is somewhat harsh to equate paper owners to shop owners and columnists to salespeople, but we cannot say that he is completely wrong. Unfortunately, there is truth in his words.” These statements deserve to be underlined. Bilgin states that there were fiscal affairs between prime ministers and media bosses in the pre-Erdoğan period and stresses that this wrong practice is no longer continued today. “I could not only be the owner of a newspaper. I also entered into businesses other than journalism. However, I had to be strong against politicians and engage only in newspaper publication in order to be able to say that paper owners should not develop trade ties with prime ministers,” he confesses.

Pointing out that although the media harshly criticizes politicians, i.e., governments, in Turkey but that they never oppose the state, Bilgin says: “It was not easy to criticize the military-dominated bureaucracy. When you wrote something about military personnel, you would immediately receive a call from the General Staff, but when you wrote something about politicians, you would receive no warning from them. This was not because they did not want to meddle with the press but because they had no power to do so. Even in those days I had developed a theory, which I called the ‘three-legged balance of power,’ consisting of the military, the judiciary and the press. These were the real powers behind the scenes. And governments were nothing but the elements playing games in between.”

Bilgin also touches on the process of formation of the twisted nature of the media: “In Turkey, the press positioned itself in a more powerful manner than would be possible in a democratic country. ... For some time, the press had grown so strong that the media bosses started to enter into bargaining over who would become coalition partners. If you look at Feb. 28, you will see that it was the media who decided who would become the prime minister. There was great competition between the Hürriyet Group and our Sabah Group. A fight over promotions was being waged. Frying pans, encyclopedias, etc., were being distributed as free gifts. We would make comparisons between the frying pans given by them and those by us or TV sets from them and those from us. Eventually we started to compare the prime ministers supported by them and those supported by us. Hürriyet supported Mesut Yılmaz, and we supported Tansu Çiller. In the end, they won. But a large-scale breakdown started in the press. During the Feb. 28 process, both the military and the media grew stronger. Governments, on the other hand, were very weak. At that time, the media made alliances with the military and the judiciary. This alliance gave the press power that they should not have had against the governments.”

The following confessions are equally striking: “The media could have raised its voice against the Feb. 28 process, but it was a very difficulty task. If it had done so, it would have suffered from a number of troubles. There were threats. You know the politically motivated murders. Tapes were coming to ATV. Our Ali Kırca would appear on the screen, and suddenly, his tone would change, and nonsensical statements were being made. I was strongly against them, but I started to lose my power as a paper owner. It was as if some sort of power came and dominated the paper. At that time, we unfortunately couldn’t wage an exemplary struggle for democracy. We acted opposite.”

“The media were not afraid of politicians. They only feared military bureaucracy. ... In Western countries, the media represents a big power, but they are equally accountable to the general public. The owners of the papers in the West do not think of abusing the power they have. ... In contrast, in Turkey there was a rush for booty-sharing after the 1995s. ... Suppose a power distribution tender would be made. One would go to İhlas, one to Show TV of Erol Aksoy and one to another media organization. Such was the case in Turkey... Actually, now is a good era. The prime minister is outspoken and does not develop close relations with the owners of newspapers. We must be fair to him as he does not develop discreditable relations. In the past, any media boss who had problems with, say, the Finance Ministry or any other state department would refer to the prime minister and solve these problems. In the past, one could reach the prime minister with a phone call. Now, they cannot reach the current one. This is how a prime minister should be. ... If the old forms of media relations were applicable, it would be impossible to maintain the investigations into Ergekenon or the Sledgehammer [Balyoz] action plan. While some of the papers opted to ignore Ergenekon and other terrible events, some of them wrote about them. They covered them, though not to the extent Taraf did. Thus, today’s press is much more diverse.”