The most critical of these items was the opening of the border, because an open border would not only immediately boost commercial and cultural relations between the two societies but also would break down psychological barriers on both sides. One of the remaining two items concerned the establishment of diplomatic relations, which would anchor this initiative in international law, and the other was the establishment of a commission of historians to spread the “side effects” of opening the border across time. There was asymmetry between Armenia and Turkey from the very beginning. From Armenia’s perspective, there is no precondition for initiating relations. Turkey’s official understanding of history and its rejection of the term genocide are not obstacles.But Turkey is worried about opening the border, because it is aware that the political atmosphere that will be created during the process as the two nations intermingle will encourage the acceptance of the term genocide. The function of the suggested commission of historians was to be a buffer, to debate the issue at a higher and more official level and to prolong the period of transition to the furthest extent possible. In other words, the commission of historians itself was a precondition set forward by the Turkish side. The Armenian side did not make this an issue; it didn’t say “I won’t open up my past to debate”; it said “I won’t change my opinion, but I am willing to talk.”
In retrospect, it’s obvious Turkey was not expecting Armenia to accept the idea of a commission of historians so quickly. It had envisioned that by using Armenia’s objection to setting up a commission, it could create the impression that Armenia was the side impairing the initiative. But it didn’t work out that way, and Turkey quickly turned to a new precondition, namely the Karabakh issue. But it was clear both in the protocols and in official documents reaffirming the meaning of the texts that there was no link between the Karabakh problem and the opening of the border. After all, the reason the border was closed was not because of Karabakh.
Contrary to Turkey’s thesis, the border was shut down eight months after the first steps for autonomy in Karabakh were taken, when Armenia invaded Azerbaijan’s territories. It is for this reason Turkey could have been expected to demand that Armenia withdraw from the occupied territories. But of course in return Armenia would have put Karabakh’s status on the table. Turkey didn’t like this potential balance, and so it took a step that would cut off the protocols from the beginning. Addressing the Azerbaijani Parliament, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the border would not be opened until the Karabakh problem was solved. The same statement was uttered by Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu several times as well. In this way a critical cue was given to Azerbaijan to not solve the problem, postponing the opportunity for a more democratic administration in Karabakh. In fact Azerbaijan went a step further and started talking about a new war.
Currently it seems that the protocols have been postponed. Turkey is not ready to carry the weight of its own initiative, but neither does it want to be held responsible for this in the international community. Turkey wants both the protocols to be impaired and to not be blamed for it. It is for this reason that it seems there is a state-backed attempt at manipulation in the Turkish media nowadays, using the Armenian constitutional court’s annotated approval as fuel. The statist central media and newspapers and television channels close to the government appear to have the same views on this matter. What’s being said is that the Armenian constitutional court has created a new precondition. The court’s decision states that the protocols cannot be in violation of the constitution. It would be unimaginable to expect any constitutional court to rule otherwise. As for the constitution, it refers to the Declaration of Independence, which declares that the Armenian government will support efforts to obtain recognition of the genocide. This is also very natural. Just as Turkey supports efforts to reject the term genocide, Armenia will encourage efforts to accept it. The protocols consider these two attitudes as information and do not request that they be changed. The objective is to start international relations at every level whilst state policies continue. The Armenian side has backed this suggestion with all its state organizations.
Thus, the effort at disinformation in Turkey is not very beneficial. On the other hand, time is passing, and we are approaching another April 24. A distressed Turkey is now talking about the intentional exertion of pressure and the existence of a secret ill intention. But the truth is out in the open. The government does not have the strength or the will to bear the weight of the Armenian initiative. Maybe they never wanted to from the beginning and just had too much confidence that the other side would not take a positive step. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) may change its mentality quickly, but sometimes other people can change their mentality even quicker.
