The end of this era allowed a new type of relationship to take root. After a bumpy start, when the two nations were seemingly rivals in the newly emerging geopolitics of Eurasia (in the end, Turkey failed to have any considerable impact, and Russia managed to keep these countries within its fold), and during the initial period of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline planning, Turkey and Russia have increasingly warm ties cooperating in a number of different fields. Turkish businesses are active in construction and retail in Russia. More than 2.5 million Russians visit Turkey every year, and there are over 50,000 mixed marriages. In more recent times, the Russians have also benefited from the deterioration in relations between Turkey and the West, being more than happy to flatter rather than criticize their neighbor.Presently, however, the relationship remains more favorable to Russia with the trade balance currently heavily in Russia’s favor. In 2008 the trade volume was at $38 billion, but Turkey’s exports to Russia were a mere $6.5 billion. 2009 saw a drop in trade due to the economic crisis, leaving the volume at $22 billion, but Prime Ministers Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared at a meeting earlier this year their aim to boost the trade volume to $100 billion within five years. However, the status quo cannot continue for this to be beneficial to Turkey. Russia must start importing more products and goods from Turkey, and Turkish citizens and products should have easier access to Russia. This means lifting the visa regime, and indeed plans are in the pipeline for this visa-free regime to become functional as of May.
Currently the main factor affecting the trade balance is energy because of Turkey’s dependence on the supply of Russian gas (around 67 percent and rising). This overdependence does not put Ankara in a very comfortable position, and Turkey is as keen as some other countries in Europe to diversify its energy sources, hence Turkey’s new energy policy to involve itself in as many energy projects as possible whether they be Russian or Western backed, the aim being to use its unique geostrategic position to develop Turkey not only as an energy corridor, bringing gas and oil from the Caspian, Middle East and Russia to the European grid, but to transform itself into a major energy hub. So while Turkey has offered its support for the European Union-backed Nabucco gas pipeline, it also supports a number of Russian initiatives including the South Stream project. Turkey’s approach has not gone down well with some in the EU who believe that Nabucco should be Turkey’s priority and have criticized Turkey for stalling and holding up the development of Nabucco (not least with its ongoing tiff with Azerbaijan over transit fees and tariffs) and for supporting South Stream. This is quite difficult for Turks to understand given that a number of EU companies and governments are also working with the Russians on South Stream (and indeed Nord Stream). This is a clear demonstration of the lack of unity within the EU on energy policy with member states having different interests and priorities. There is one winner from this approach -- Russia. While the EU talks, the Russians do business -- buying up gas and approaching new partners.
Furthermore, while Turkey is a growing regional player, it is still no match for Russia, and the countries have a divergence of interests when it comes to solving problems in their region. For example, while Russian Prime Minister Putin states that there is no linkage between the process of rapprochement under way between Turkey and Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey insists there is. This creates problems because Turkey expected Russia to put pressure on Armenia for a solution as Ankara continues to cite that the ratification of the two protocols to normalize relations between the two neighbors must be preceded by Armenia withdrawing its troops from the Azerbaijani provinces it currently occupies. It seems to have been a very naïve approach from Turkey if it believed that Moscow was so desperate for a solution to Karabakh that it would pressure Yerevan to do this. Rather Russia has been quite happy with the status quo for the last 15 years and is in no desperate hurry to change it. Therefore, the Kremlin is quite happy to go along with Armenian policy on this. Russia has a fixed policy when it comes to Yerevan, which is Moscow’s closest ally in the South Caucasus. It does not want to lose it. Furthermore, Russian thinking is in line with that of the rest of the international community. Turkey and Azerbaijan are alone on this one.
So while Turkey and Russia are getting closer and strengthening economic ties, it is still far from being a “strategic partnership” but more a result of common interests, which still very much tips in Russia’s favor, and Turkey should take care that Russia does not, as it is prone to, manipulate economic interests in order to create pressure on the political relationship.
