It is true that Turkey took a historic step when it signed two protocols with Armenia in Zurich, Switzerland, on Oct. 10 of last year. The protocols envisage the establishment of diplomatic relations as well as the development of relations between Ankara and Yerevan. They are scheduled to go into effect following their approval by the parliaments of both countries.
Turkey sent the protocols to Parliament for approval in early November; they are now waiting for the decision of the Foreign Relations Committee. The Armenian Constitutional Court, as part of its internal process, issued a decision last week giving the green light to the ratification of the protocols. However, the court referenced the preamble of the Armenian Constitution as well as Article 11 of the Armenian Declaration of Independence, which seeks the acceptance of Armenian genocide claims and Yerevan’s territorial claims on Turkey.
Ankara describes these references as setting preconditions on the protocols before their ratification and wants them corrected before they are approved by the Armenian Parliament. However, neither of those allusions have a binding nature on the protocols signed by the two states.
Despite this fact, it is obvious that with its decision to comment on two sensitive issues neither Turkey nor any other country will accept, the Armenian Constitutional Court sought to satisfy its domestic audience as well as the Armenian diaspora. In this sense, it is correct for us to say that Armenian hard-liners sought to sabotage the normalization of ties with Turkey.
According to several retired Turkish ambassadors I spoke with, the Armenian court’s decision reflects the attitude of an amateurish and second-class court.
The Armenian court’s reasoning had an eclectic nature to it (its wording contradicted itself), mixing various political and legal claims with each other. This reflects the poor level of the Armenian court’s progress in the 19 years since independence.
From the diplomatic point of view, however, the decision section of the Armenian court’s ruling is important. This section gives a green light to the ratification of the protocols signed with Turkey by the Armenian Parliament and rules that they conform with the Armenian Constitution without linking them to any preconditions.
Despite this, the Turkish government’s decision to urge Armenia to correct the court’s decision seems like Ankara has found an excuse to drag its feet in making any effort to ratify the protocols. In addition, Ankara was aware that Yerevan had not abandoned its policy on territorial claims and genocide recognition when it signed the protocols because it set no preconditions.
This displays that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has surrendered to the blackmail of the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is in the opposition, and the religious-leaning Felicity Party (SP). The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has also long been engaged in narrow political considerations, creating a stumbling block before Turkish-Armenian reconciliation.
At this stage, the AK Party does not appear to be able to overcome the opposition’s blackmail due to domestic considerations, allowing itself to be taken hostage.
