One of the main goals of contemporary Turkish foreign policy is to try and minimize conflicts around Turkey so that the country can reach its full potential in international relations. With that in mind, Turkey pursues a “zero problems with neighbors” policy in a vast geographical and historical hinterland. And Ankara is eager to get involved in the conflict resolution processes of others. It is therefore inconceivable for Ankara to choose to have constant tension with Israel. However, Ankara seems to have adopted a policy of tension as a temporary tool to push Israel toward being a more constructive player in the Middle East. Paradoxically, by doing so, Ankara puts itself increasingly at odds with Israel and at odds with its larger goal of eliminating conflict.
For the sake of resolving a larger regional conflict which also threatens Turkey’s strategic interests, Ankara may be content with a temporary deterioration in relations with Israel. However, the Turkish policy of tension is constrained by the degree to which Israel bows to foreign pressure. True, Israel is getting more and more alienated in the international arena. But Israeli public and political will to protect its national interests and national security still remain resolute. In other words, “good cop” initiatives toward Israel might not have produced the desired effect for Turkey. But that does not necessarily mean “bad cop” approaches would work either. Furthermore, I’m not sure if that helps Turkey’s aspirations to be a mediator between Israel and Arabs.
Tel Aviv complains about the lack of a similarly forceful attitude on Ankara’s part toward unconstructive Arab and Muslim players, such as Hamas. And that brings us to the civilizational dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Turkey, regardless of the political parties in power, has always sympathized with the plight of Palestinian Muslims. (By the way, that has never been at the expense of Israel’s right to exist.) So there is no new story there. One should not solely blame this bias on the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) simply because they may be more religious than others.
The historical record proves that there is a correlation between Israel’s willingness to make concessions for peace and a positive Turkish attitude, and vice versa. For example, in 1980, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic representation to the junior chargé d’affaires level in reaction to a controversial Israeli decision vis-à-vis East Jerusalem. Ankara elevated its diplomatic representation to ambassadorial level for the first time in 1991, the year the Madrid Conference was held. The first foreign ministerial level visit from Turkey to Israel came about two months after the Oslo Accords were officially signed in Washington on Sept. 13, 1993. In the late 1990s, Israel-Turkey relations witnessed a surge, especially in cooperation in defense. However, military actions against Palestinians in the early 2000s drew sharp criticism from Prime Ministers Bülent Ecevit and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Israel’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip in 2005 once again softened the Turkish position until Israel’s Gaza offensive in 2008. With no Middle East peace process in sight, Ankara has been angry with Israel ever since.
Thanks to a revolution in communication and improvements in Turkey’s democracy, the role of public opinion in Turkish foreign policy has become a much bigger factor, especially in the last decade. An anti-war attitude in the Turkish media damages Israel’s image in Turkey. Each time there is an armed conflict, most Turks hold Israel more responsible. Currently, the humanitarian situation in the aftermath of the Gaza operation is a major sore spot for the Turkish government and public.
If Israelis want to improve relations with Turkey and fight anti-Semitism, they must stay away from controversial military actions and invest more in public diplomacy. They should diversify their contacts in the Turkish establishment and society. They rely too much on the weakening Kemalist secularists and generally ignore engaging with the strengthening religious conservatives. Israelis have reason to be sensitive about rising anti-Semitism in Turkey. But in a similar fashion, many Turks are concerned about Islamophobia in Israel and the world’s Jewry. Both issues need to be tackled seriously.
Turkey, on the other hand, has to be more balanced with its moral arguments. Taking a more critical approach toward anti-Israeli terrorist tactics would help. And Turkish leaders, especially Prime Minister Erdoğan, should criticize Israeli policies in a less public and more careful way.
Given the political and societal conditions, ups and downs in relations between Turkey and Israel seem inevitable for the foreseeable future. Yet that should not prevent leaders in both countries from acting as thoughtfully as they can. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon’s extremely insulting attitude toward Turkish Ambassador Ahmet Oğuz Çelikkol was not a good example in that regard. I’m glad Israel has formally apologized.
