This gave an important psychological advantage to Israel against its Arab neighbors, which criticized Ankara for this alliance for many years after the signing of the agreements. In the past several years, however, the Arabs appeared to have been less suspicious about close Turkish-Israeli military ties.
In my opinion, Arab suspicion had more to do with political jealousy of Turkish-Israeli rapprochement at the time rather than a misperception by the Arabs that this alliance targeted them. To start with, Arabs are well aware that the Turkish-Israeli military relationship has never been against any third country, provided that these third countries did not and do not develop hostile policies against Ankara.
Back in 1998, before the capture of the leader of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, in 1999, it was Israel’s existence as an ally busying Syria in the south that increased perceptions that the Turkish army could easily invade this country from the north if Damascus continued harboring Öcalan. Israel’s very existence to the south of Syria made it weaker in the north, making a possible Turkish invasion of this country more likely to succeed. A Turkish invasion did not take place, as Syria quietly sent Öcalan resulting in his capture in Nairobi before being handed over to Ankara. After this event, Turkey and Syria signed a confidence-building agreement pledging to cooperate in the fight against terror.
In the meantime, Turkish-Israeli cooperation agreements allowed Israel to conduct training exercises in Turkish airspace with its jet fighters. This was an important advantage for Israel due to its narrow airspace. In return Turkey benefitted from Israeli technological superiority after the two countries forged strong defense industry cooperation. Both military and defense industry cooperation agreements between Turkey and Israel have become possible under the US’s blessing. The US has historically protected Israel against outside threats. In addition, through Israeli transfer of technology to Turkish industries, US administrations have managed to circumvent the US Congress, which used to create serious obstacles before arms transfers to Ankara due to strong Armenian and Jewish lobbies.
Turkish-Israeli defense industry cooperation has never been smooth; however, it has been working.
The honeymoon between Turkey and Israel gave signals of ending in the early 2000s as the late Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, under the coalition government of the time, raised his voice against Israel’s disproportional attacks against Muslim Palestinians. He once accused Israel of committing genocide. Turkish criticism of Israel has seen an increase under the Islam-sensitive ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and reached a peak after Israel’s Gaza offensive in late December 2008 and January 2009.
In addition, some Turkish TV serials depicting Israeli soldiers as baby killers have agitated the Israeli side, which culminated with an Israeli official attempting to humiliate Turkish Ambassador to Israel Oğuz Çelikkol last week. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon met with Ambassador Çelikkol last week. During the meeting, Turkey’s ambassador was seated on a low sofa, and facing him, in higher chairs, were Ayalon and two other officials.
Israel’s apology to Turkey over its treatment of the Turkish ambassador has, for the time being, reduced tension between the two countries.
To remind my readers, Israel in the past has not only pursued policies to provoke Turkey on sensitive issues such as the Armenian claims of genocide by Ottoman Turks in 1915 but also on another sensitive issue, that of Turkey’s Kurds. I recalled this to share with my readers that none of the parties have been innocent when it comes to provoking each other.
Ehud Barak’s brief visit to Ankara on Sunday, following Israel’s apology due to its treatment of the Turkish ambassador, has for the time being taken the heat off both sides. But the Turkish public is deeply hurt by the Israeli treatment of its ambassador, while Israelis will most likely not forget what Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told Israeli President Shimon Peres in Davos last year during his famous “One minute” walkout of the meeting, saying, “You know quite well how to kill.”
In addition to President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan, Turkish Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ also declined to meet with Barak during his short visit to Ankara last Sunday.
But Başbuğ’s refusal to meet with Barak does not mean that military relations will continue to be sour while political relations among the two nations languish. On the contrary, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül’s remarks during a joint press conference with Barak that Turkey expects Israel to continue technological cooperation in a way that will enable sales to third countries signals the continuation of this cooperation.
Last year, when Erdoğan asked Gönül to cancel the Heron unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) deal with Israel, the latter declined to do so. This also explains that the Turkish military’s desire to continue both military as well as defense industry cooperation with Israel.
