Many experts say the undersecretariat, intended to create a mechanism to coordinate the fight against terrorism and to produce policies for an efficient way to combat terror, was stillborn. This is mainly because it does not have any operational functions and will not remove the existing concept of a national security state at work in the country.
According to a draft law sent to Parliament in May of last year, scheduled to be debated today, the undersecretariat will function like a statistics board, compiling intelligence information, but it will have no operational functions nor the power to impose sanctions on institutions refusing to share intelligence information.
If security units created under various names by the prime minister’s office since 2006 have been unable to remove weaknesses of the myriad security institutions in Turkey, how will this new undersecretariat fulfill its purpose when it has no operational powers?
The undersecretariat also carries the risk that personnel from the military, which has constantly been at odds with the government, may use the information it will obtain from this unit for its own purposes.
Despite several laws and regulations adopted as part of democratic reforms, it has not yet become possible for the political authority to bring under its umbrella intelligence information collected by both the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the Gendarmerie General Command (JGK), resulting in serious weaknesses in both ensuring law and order within the country and in preventing possible threats that may come from outside. A bitter rivalry between the JGK -- de facto under TSK authority -- and the police, affiliated with the Interior Ministry, both of which are responsible for ensuring law and order, is a result of the former’s resistance to share intelligence with the latter.
During a press conference in May of last year, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay emphasized the importance of coordination among various intelligence-gathering institutions. He said this is a problematic area in Turkey, adding that the new draft law attempts to remove these problems.
However, reasons cited for the creation of the Undersecretariat of Security have fallen short of removing the above-mentioned problem that exists in the intelligence-sharing mechanism.
The draft law also does not answer questions such as: What institutions will members of the undersecretariat execute inspections at in the absence of operational powers, what are their limits in fulfilling their responsibilities, and why have slush funds been earmarked for the undersecretariat if it has not been tasked with anything?
The main aim of creating the undersecretariat should have been to bring military intelligence under the control of the prime minister’s office while making intelligence-gathering institutions more effective. The undersecretariat, however, will not even make the JGK accountable to civilian authority.
This means the security undersecretariat will remain an empty unit unless civilian democratic oversight of both the TSK and the JGK, which are currently enjoying a privileged and autonomous status, is ensured.
A report released by İstanbul-based Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) on Dec. 2 of last year concludes that Turkey’s security-centered mentality continues to dominate.
The security undersecretariat, in this sense, the TESEV report says, is a reflection of this mentality.
