When the visit of a foreign head of state is not an official visit but a working one, this means there is an urgent need to thoroughly discuss a specific matter or there are common precautions to be taken regarding an important crisis. That’s why this visit is one of the indicators that there are growing risks in our region, where serious developments are expected in the near future.As the presidents talked tête-à-tête, we must be content with what we were told in the press release. According to the joint statement, the two heads of state mainly discussed the Palestinian problem. As you know, Egypt has always played a crucial role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, this conflict is so complicated that it is not easy to put all its components in a vast basket labeled the “Israeli-Palestinian problem.” For instance, when one says “Palestine,” we must inquire about which Palestine one is talking. Understanding who is supporting who is another complicated matter. The Egyptian leader defines “Palestine” in the same fashion as Israel --because he is worried about radical religious groups that want to take over the government in his country and he wants to maintain Egypt’s domestic balance.
Since the Palestinian independence movement has become internationalized, Egypt has changed its policy on this subject many times. In the beginning, it showed an anti-imperialistic solidarity with the Palestinians that wasn’t exempt from Islamic connotations. Then, its anti-imperialistic solidarity was based on Arab nationalism and a third-worldist/leftist rhetoric. Following its exclusion from the Arab League in the wake of its recognition of Israel, it had to modify its stance once more. Recently, when it became clear that there are two “Palestines,” Egypt hesitated for a moment over who to support. As Egypt follows a pro-American line in its strategic choices, it has chosen to support the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and to ignore Hamas, hoping that the latter’s rule over Gaza is an ephemeral anomaly. But time has shown that ending up with two separate Palestinian states is a serious risk.
Despite its close relations with the US and Israel, Egypt has always preferred to stay away from Turkey, which happens to be an ally of these two countries. In addition, Cairo has never missed an opportunity to oppose Turkey’s growing influence in the Middle East. However, following Turkey’s criticism of Israel during its Gaza operation over the winter of 2008-2009 and Ankara’s unequivocal position about including Hamas in the peace process, Turkey’s credit has increased considerably in the Palestinians’ eyes. This has disturbed Israel, but also forced Egypt to reconsider its choices: either Egypt will continue to support the PLO and ignore Hamas or it will support a process that includes Hamas, as Turkey advocates. This second choice is risky for the Egyptian government, and it is likely to cause complications in its relations with Israel. But the first choice is a dead end, anyway. So Egypt now appears to be seeking a third way, in the hope of not having to choose between these two options. It is trying to set up a new game that includes Turkey, based on a “good cop/bad cop” model. Reaching an agreement on this could open up a new path assuring regional stability.
