The bilateral agenda was primarily composed of Iran, Afghanistan, Armenia, Israel, Iraq, Cyprus and Russia. This list alone tells how complex and overarching Turkey’s foreign policy agenda for Washington has become. If the two leaders wanted to spend an equal amount of time on each of these issues, there would have been only 10 to 15 minutes dedicated to each topic. Yet, since all issues are not equal, this was not the case. Washington, after all, is a city where “the urgent trumps the important.” And as far as urgency goes, there were only two major issues that qualified for the immediate and special attention of the two leaders: Iran and Armenia.On Armenia, the urgency has to do more with domestic American politics than Turkey itself. It is very likely that President Barack Obama reminded Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, particularly during their one on one, about the risks of complacency. Ankara may have its reasons to procrastinate in terms of ratifying the two protocols in the Turkish Parliament. Prime Minister Erdoğan probably explained how difficult it is for his political party to go ahead with these two protocols (establishing diplomatic relations and opening the border) without some progress in Nagorno-Karabakh. He has a point. After all, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is already getting a beating at the opinion polls because of its democratic initiative on the Kurdish question. Yet, all politics is local. And President Obama probably reminded him of his own domestic political predicament vis-à-vis the US Congress, where an Armenian Genocide resolution can only be effectively opposed by the White House if there is tangible, quick and substantial progress in Turkish-Armenian relations. In short, the story remains the same for both leaders. Erdoğan needs a face-saving reason -- progress in Nagorno-Karabakh -- to force the two protocols through the Turkish Parliament. Obama, in turn, needs his own face-saving excuse -- visible Turkish-Armenian reconciliation -- to fight the Armenian lobby’s efforts in US Congress to pass the Armenian Genocide resolution. No wonder this issue is the most urgent in bilateral relations. Imagine what would happen to all the other issues in the Turkish-American agenda if the US Congress passed such a genocide resolution.
The second most important issue was of course Iran. My own sense of where we are on Iran in Turkish-American relations is that there is more convergence than divergence between Ankara and Washington. The international press, not surprisingly, likes to focus on the sensational: the risk of Turkey siding with Iran on the nuclear issue. But in reality, Washington seems content with Turkey’s effort to talk some sense to Iranians. The key issue to understand here is simple: the Turkish rhetoric in public vis-à-vis Iran is significantly different than the Turkish message conveyed to Tehran in private. This looks like very bad public diplomacy on Turkey’s part. Yet, the fact of the matter is that this pro-Iran image of Turkey helps Ankara’s credibility and influence when Erdoğan or Ahmet Davutoğlu meet with their counterparts behind close doors. In other words, Turkey has the same goals as the international community. It is just that it has different tactics. And most importantly, Washington, again more in private than in public, seems to appreciate the existence of such a Turkish channel of communication with Iran.
At the end of the day, last week’s visit provided a good opportunity to refresh the chemistry between the two leaders and to put the Turkish-American bilateral agenda on the same page as far as the top priorities are concerned. More troublesome, however, is what is going in Turkish domestic politics. On that front, the big story is the Constitutional Courts decision to shut down the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). The AKP’s Kurdish opening was already facing daunting challenges. Now, the initiative is officially on life-support. This is a very dangerous situation because there is so much at stake with the Kurdish issue. The future of peace, stability, democracy and economic growth in Turkey depends on solving this cancerous problem. One can only hope that the old guards of Turkey’s nationalist establishment will not deter and derail the reform agenda.
