Concerning civilian-military relations

Effectiveness in civilian-military relations generally depends on the roles and responsibilities of civilian and military leaders and appropriate changes in their interactions and relationships. Turkey presents peculiarities in this because its successive constitutions have always been written so as to establish a clear chain of command over civilians by their military overseers. The struggle against terrorism in the Southeast, the reactions to the last presidential and public elections and the transition to the AKP government have all strained civilian-military relations. Retired and uniformed officers have not respected the apolitical status of their positions of responsibility. Drawing on lessons from previous military interventions, some assumed they were untouchable and unaccountable. When uniformed and retired military officers get involved in putsch-mongering, definitions of threats, duties and appropriate conduct cannot be decided.

The distrust between politicians and soldiers arises out of their different worldviews, despite their ostensible allegiance to the same Constitution. The military’s recent overt and covert interference in partisan politics and its relationships with corrupt businessmen make it even harder to maintain the requisite bonds of trust, partnership and subordination to the civilian authorities. Abdullah Gül’s accession to the presidency, his moderation and care to avoid disputes by working closely with civilian and military authorities have not received due respect from the military. The military has been acting as if it were the opposition party.

The role of the minister of defense in a democracy is to provide a bridge between the president, Parliament and the military. The best ministers of defense are those who support the interagency process, who become problem solvers and who transform the military in a way that suits the times. However, in Turkey defense ministers are always picked and approved by the military. A passive minister is never seen as problematic in civilian-military relations, for no sense of responsibility for fixing anything is ever imparted to the mnister. For example, we have heard nothing from the defense minister before, during or after military interventions or cross-border operations and nothing about victories or failures in military campaigns, newly developed strategies or weapons.

In contrast, we have heard much from the chief of General Staff about public education, religion and economics but not much about transformation toward a smaller, professional military with an integrated reserve force, shifting from a largely ideological, hierarchical structure to a more flattened hierarchy of expertise. We have never seen a military officer resign or retire because he disagrees with the emerging national security policies of the government. What we have seen is many senior officers mistakenly believing that there is no alternative to their own strategy of armed conflict. With the exception of the former Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi Özkök, we have not seen any chief of General Staff receptive to suggestions, let alone to criticism, from civilians. Nor are there any suggestions or alternatives from senior military leaders that widen the policy debates about the military in Turkey. With their latest interventions in government, Parliament, democracy and the rule of law, the leaders of our military have lost credibility. They need to change their mindset to build trust and respect with the people, government and Parliament of Turkey. They need to regain the trust of lower-ranking officers, too.

In a fully functioning democracy, debate between the military and civilian leadership can be acceptable if it is regulated. Turkey could gain much if a competent national defense team made up of civil-governmental and military authorities were established. The team might become a means to understanding officers’ concerns, to treating the military with the respect they genuinely deserve and also to holding the military accountable.