The AKP’s share of the vote has decreased, from 47 percent in 2007 to 39 percent in the local elections last March, while the economy has shrunk by 6 percent and the urban unemployment rate soared to 16 percent. Despite these circumstances, the AKP government has started initiatives not only to normalize relations with Armenia, but also to bringing to an end the armed conflict with the PKK by extending the cultural and political rights of the Kurds and implementing an undeclared amnesty for PKK militants. Can the AKP win a third election under these circumstances and with these initiatives?
It may be argued that like all previous elections in Turkey, the economy will be the decisive factor. If forecasts of near 4 percent growth and a tangible decrease in unemployment during 2010 materialize, the AKP vote may not fall behind the 39 percent garnered last March during a period when the economy hit the bottom.
The rival Republican People’s (CHP) and Nationalist Movement (MHP) parties are, like all policies of the AKP government, opposing the opening towards Armenia, claiming that the protocols signed with Yerevan amounts to nothing less than a sellout of Turkey’s national interests and those of close ally Azerbaijan. Even if the rapprochement with Armenia does not make any progress until the next elections, it is unlikely to cost votes for the AKP. But if it does make progress, leading to opening of the border with Armenia and even to a move towards an Armenian pullout from occupied Azerbaijani territories, that would surely bring extra votes to the AKP.
It seems like the AKP government, in tandem with the military authorities, is working towards bringing to an end to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). For this purpose the government seems to be engaged in negotiations with the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in Parliament, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) with Abdullah Öcalan (the imprisoned leader of the PKK) and PKK leaders in the Kandil Mountains in northern Iraq and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the governments of the US, Iraq, Syria, Iran and the Kurdish regional administration in Iraq.
Last week efforts towards an end to the PKK insurgency seemed to begin to yield results. Eight PKK militants from Kandil and 26 Turkish Kurds (including women and children) who had fled the country in 1993 and settled in the Mahmour camp in Iraqi Kurdistan returned home to Turkey through the border gate with Iraq. Twenty-nine of them were released immediately after questioning by prosecutors, and five others (accused of membership in the PKK) were released pending trial. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said this was a most positive and pleasing development and called on all PKK members whether in Kandil, Mahmour or Europe to return home to Turkey without delay.
The returnees were welcomed in mass demonstrations on the way to and in Diyarbakır, the main Kurdish-majority city. The Kurds of the region had every reason to celebrate. The vast majority of the 40,000 people killed in the clashes between security forces and the PKK during the last 25 years were Kurds, and it was the Kurdish part of the country whose villages were evacuated and people forced to migrate. The celebrations also signified a call to PKK members to lay down their arms and come back home to lead normal lives.
The CHP and MHP, of course, denounced the return and release of PKK militants and accused the government of nothing less than treason. Organizations of families of members of security forces killed by the PKK staged protests. Both President Abdullah Gül and Erdoğan warned that mass celebrations endanger the continuation of the peace process and must cease. Erdoğan, however, declared that the government is determined to bring the peace initiative to a successful end.
The minister of interior stated that the initiative will continue with administrative measures and amendments to certain laws and the Constitution, which are expected to broaden cultural and political rights of the Kurds.
The CHP and MHP are likely, however, to try to garner votes by increasing agitation against the peace initiative, whose success, its leaders fear, may push them out of business. Those forces who have a vested interest in the continuation of the hostilities are likely to stage provocations to subvert the peace process. Its success is, therefore, uncertain. But it is likely, considering that the vast majority of Kurds both in Turkey and Iraq no longer approve of the continuation of PKK insurgency.
If the initiative goes astray, the AKP will surely lose part of its electorate, especially the Kurdish vote it enjoys. But if it brings violence to an end, that will definitely boost the AKP’s share of the vote all over the country.
I tend to believe that the AKP government is engaged in important initiatives that may not only “get Turkey unstuck” (in the words of Johan Galtung), but even earn it a third term in power, under the assumption, of course, that Turkey has moved further towards consolidating democratic civilian rule, that the era of military interventions is over and that the Constitutional Court will not once more attempt to ban the governing party.
