On the other hand, the characteristics of the republic, attributable to how it was established, introduce ideological restrictions on the room for maneuver for religious identity. Without big or revolutionary reforms, it is impossible to undertake major reforms in individual areas. The catch is that a revolutionary reform can only be undertaken by a “secular” government and there is not a single “secular” party that intends to do so.Society is in the grips of a dilemma. Voters tend to accept the reformist qualities of the political party they vote for and at the same time, they are forced to accept the failure of the same party to implement the reforms that the party promised to make. The Kurdish issue is a complicated issue and we expect common sense, not only from the government, but also from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), which is the natural addressee of the government. When a political party with a religious identity attempts to undertake reforms, there is nothing easier for the DTP to create “opposition.” No step taken by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) will be sufficient and no reform proposed by it will be to the point. The AK Party will reach the desired point only gradually. The easier opposition formula for the DTP, it seems, will be to demand immediate action and to raise the bar on the settlement of the Kurdish issue. However, the dilemma that is applicable to the society as a whole is also valid for Kurds and the DTP: if they raise the bar too high, they may end up with no reform at the end of the day.
The speeches delivered at the party congress of the DTP and the recent statements made by Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan should be analyzed from this perspective. It is clear from the slogans chanted and images seen at the party congress that there is a hawkish group within the party who feed on the distribution of power within the party. This group does not want the DTP to cooperate with the government. For this reason, they try to raise the bar in the settlement of the Kurdish issue. They do this in two ways. First, they employ certain DTP spokesmen to blackmail or voice threats by implying that clashes may start again if reforms are not implemented. Second, they build psychological walls in front of the government’s reform moves by associating these reforms not with citizenship, but with Kurdishness.
The efforts to block the reforms by raising the bar are visible also on the other side and these efforts are implemented by two similar methods. On one hand, we not only see the military demand parliamentary consent for cross-border military operations, but also observe that this evolves into a sort of bargaining item. In other words, the military does not raise objections to the reforms in the Kurdish issue and gives an impression of being pro-government, but in return, they legitimize their own cross-border operations. Supportive of this, opposition parties talk about the risk of the Kurdish initiative dividing the country and demand that a military operation should immediately be conducted into northern Iraq. Another tactic to raise the bar is to devise faits accomplis that will complicate things for the government. For instance, court warrants demanding the some DTP deputies to be taken to hearings by force although they have parliamentary immunity are examples of such faits accomplis. Actually, the local court had decided to stop the trial, but things were allowed to develop to this point. The reason why the trial was stopped is because of the Justice Ministry, which applied to the Supreme Court of Appeals for review. In other words, the government has placed itself into a dilemma through its own agency. Yes, but why did the Justice Ministry act in this way? The answer explains the system in Turkey well. The application for judicial review was prepared and carried out by the bureaucrats of the ministry without informing the minister.
It is obvious that the government may not be allowed to take the settlement of the Kurdish issue to completion and it may even not be allowed to undertake some small steps. In the formula for success, the AK Party is a necessary, but insufficient element. Other necessary, but equally insufficient elements, too, should assume responsibility and take risks, and one such element is definitely the DTP. For this reason, this party should quickly abandon its natural opposition mentality and act more responsibly. Kurds who do not support the DTP should be encouraged to engage in politics and open debates can be performed within Kurdish groups. Otherwise, the atmosphere of confidence needed for reforms cannot be created. The bar of politics has two ends and no progress can be made as long as one end is higher than the other.
