|  
  |  
  |  
  |  
RSS
  |  
  |  
February 13, 2012
 
 
 
 
 
 
Columnists 15 October 2009, Thursday 0 0 0 0
MUHAMMED ÇETİN
cetin.m@todayszaman.com

Elites: sustainers or underminers of democratization

There is evidence that Turkey is now in the process of a thoroughgoing democratization. It can be seen in the latest government efforts -- the democratic initiative, the treaty with Armenia, the “zero-problems” with neighboring countries policy, the work toward a more civic constitution and EU membership.
Yet, Turkey's economic development, the weight of the military in civic issues and the resultant deficits in the rule of law, and the centrality of the judicial and bureaucratic elites remain the primary challenges to establishing democracy, and their effects may determine its quality and sustainability.

One authoritarian or undemocratic regime after another has given way to democratic restructuring since the mid 1970s, as for example with the death of Francisco Franco in Spain and the collapse of the António de Oliveira Salazar dictatorship in Portugal. By the 1990s, the world was witnessing a new surge of democratization in countries that had never experienced democratic parliamentary rule, in Africa, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

However, many of the democracies that have arisen since the 1970s are not flawless, but fragile, and in some cases are relapsing to a “third form” -- between democracy and monopolistic-elitist authoritarianism.

The level of economic development of a democratizing country has a considerable impact on whether the democracy it builds can sustain itself over time. However, democratization can be played out in poor as well as rich countries; for democratization to endure, other factors also come into play, such as equality, the nature and performance of the parliamen­tary system, political liberties and civil rights. Even though there is always backsliding, some of the poorest countries have leapt forward to democracy and have relatively high scores on democratic attributes -- in particular, Albania, Kyrgyzstan, Croatia, Slovakia and Mongolia in the first years of post-Socialism.

In these and other countries, whether European, Asian or South American, sustained democratization and economic growth, weaken the power base of authoritarian forces. A dense civil society expands and gains significant capacity to check monopolistic gov­ernments. Individuals or groups from a sizeable middle class take part in and aim to secure the democratic project. Civil society becomes or produces a more educated, attentive and expectant public that demands inclusion, accountability and further liberal, cultural and constitutional rights.

In the transition to a democratic civil society, political elites and the judicial bureaucracy play a central role: democratization seems to depend heavily on their understanding, interests, values and actions. Their members become potentially downwardly or upwardly mobile. These elites and bureaucracies can become divided and thus increase or decrease the probability of democratic outcomes substantially. They lead the community either to a more authoritarian state or to expanded political choices. As examples of this, the recent transitions to democracy in Spain, Poland and Turkey can be cited. The willingness of the elites in power or seeking power to negotiate with each other, or not, strongly influences the behavior of the major part of the public. For instance, at present in Turkey the two opposition parties (the Republican People's Party [CHP] and the Nationalist Movement Party [MHP]) are refusing to even meet with the president and prime minister to discuss the negotiation and establishment of political and cultural rights for Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin or rapprochement with Armenia. Here we see an established elite digging in its heels and refusing to cooperate with changes which are potentially beneficial to all.

For this reason, while others understand it to be a byproduct of larger social forces, some scholars argue that democracy is a byproduct of elite actions. Thus, elites and the bureaucracy -- political, judicial and military -- can be seen as initiators, representatives, sustainers, and then in contrast, underminers of long-term developments in the rise or consolidation of democracy. They affect the forms and density of civil society and social capital. They influence public opinion and can polarize it to a certain extent, violating the democratic rules of the game -- and all the while claiming that they are saving democracy by doing so. This “double-dealing” is a very precise description of the actions of some members of the military, political and judicial elites in Turkey today.

These interest groups can be expected to be constrained by the rules of the democratic game only to varying degrees, a factor which affects the quality of democracy which can be achieved and its subsequent sustainability. The Turkish public therefore needs to keep an ever-watchful eye on the country's elites now. These groups can use their power to either protect democracy or to destroy it, especially in periods of political or economic crisis, such as Turkey, the Middle East region and the globe are now enduring.

Weather
City>>
ISTANBUL
Today Tue Wed
3C°
11C°
3C°
7C°
1C°
4C°