The interior minister says he will pay visits to two other provinces as well as some districts connected to these provinces and hold random meetings with ordinary people. He adds that the initiative process is progressing as planned. When reminded that the opposition parties note that there is no content to the package, so they cannot be expected to give support to an empty package, he responds: "Yes, there is no package, but a process. There are many preparations. Regulations have been prepared and bills have been drafted. These will be sent to Parliament. This is the outcome of seven years of work and this is not a novel project."
The opposition parties claim that the democratic initiative is being conducted as a closed box. Some of them say that they cannot make an assessment because they do not know about its content. Given the fact that opposition is concentrated in the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the lack of clear content will further escalate the tension. The government does not disclose its content, but obviously, it is managing the process with a wise strategy. Everyone agrees that October will be characterized by the debates concerning the content of the process.
Democratic initiative strategy of the opposition parties
The attempt by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to meet with CHP leader Deniz Baykal has evolved into a concrete step with a letter he sent to him. This letter that Erdoğan signed in his capacity as prime minister contains his request for a meeting with Baykal to discuss the democratic initiative. The MHP and the CHP are still waging strict opposition to the initiative. Clearly, this opposition has gathered some popular support. Yet, there is and must be a limit to it. It is inevitable that first the CHP and then the MHP will be part of the negotiation process. It is reasonable to develop and pursue policies riding on the anti-Kurdish popular wave that is getting bigger and bigger each day. Indeed, such a strategy has nothing to do with politics, but with a call to violence. The CHP, which has been pursuing a hesitant policy since the start of the initiative, as well as the MHP -- after holding the party congress in early November -- will inescapably make their contributions to settlement.
Turkey has gone through a severe economic crisis parallel to the global crisis. It is perfectly understandable that this economic crisis may have escalated social tension. As the rate of unemployment rises, social tension -- particularly in metropolitan cities to the west of the country -- is translated into ethnic tension in the accompanying political debates. Existing tensions are easily expressed via ethnic identities. And the MHP opts for politicizing these tensions. However, the politicizing of the rage is not politics. It is not easy to voice a reaction and to translate it into a political attitude and build a program on it.
The typical supporters of the CHP have already started to exert pressure on the CHP. The CHP will have to find equilibrium between its fear of losing electoral support to the MHP in the western provinces and the reactions voiced by the main body of its typical voters. For this reason, it is generally agreed that the CHP will eventually lend support, though limited, to the initiative.
However, the opposition parties do not have any clear strategy about the initiative. What they do is just politicize the reactions that emerge in society for several reasons and translate them into a political language. However, neither Turkey nor society stays where they are.
Ethnic animosity
One of the striking incidents of the last week was the eventful soccer match between Bursaspor and Diyarbakırspor in Bursa. The match unexpectedly developed ethnic tension. Concerning the match, Diyarbakırspor Chairman Çetin Sümer said: "...Acting in an organized manner, they walked toward us. They waved Turkish flags, as if we were from a different nation and a different country." Moreover, he said this in the Kurdish language on the Voice of America radio station. I have no interest in soccer. But I think I have become a fan of Diyarbakırspor, just like many people in Turkey, after this match. It is equally unfair to put the blame on Bursa. As hopes for settlement rise, so does a guided tension. And this guidance is provided by the opposition parties. The entire country showed harsh reactions to the tension at the match and the animosity toward Diyarbakırspor. These reactions were more important than the incidents that occurred on the field.
Closeness, group solidarity and common culture seen among ethnic groups also exist among soccer fans. Just like an ethnic identity, being a soccer fan satisfies the need for belonging to a homogeneous group that shares the same feelings and sentiments. Just like totems of the clans, soccer teams have symbols and colors -- which are more readily understandable. More importantly, just like ethnic identities, in order for soccer fans to survive, they need to struggle or compete among soccer teams. Continuous tension keeps ethnic/soccer identities alive and serves as a justification for solidarity and common spirit within the group.
For this reason, it is no coincidence that ethnic tension is expressed in soccer fields in its most primitive, roughest and most violent form. Soccer introduces rules for competition or struggle. On the other hand, ethnic tensions are maintained in a purely chaotic environment and in the most unfair form. There are no rules and no referees to punish breaches of those rules. Moreover, blood is spilled.
Turkey is trying to solve an entrenched ethnic problem by raising democratic standards. At the point, we should note that "ethnic community" or "ethnic identity" exists together with "ethnic struggle." Tight networks of solidarity create tight poles of animosity. Turkey has the risk of finding itself in a widespread struggle as it solves an ethnic problem relating to Kurds. Placing the Kurdish ethnic identity at the forefront leads to the emergence of other ethnic identities which have been overlooked or neglected until now.
The government’s strategy: 14 common denominators
In the face of the opposition parties’ attitude of politicizing the rage, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) pursues a wise and balanced policy. The democratic initiative needs a certain political atmosphere to make progress. This atmosphere must be constructive and moderate. In his every move, the prime minister tries to pave the way for such an atmosphere. Fourteen names he had referred to during the speech he delivered during the party congress last week were intended to soften the atmosphere. The repercussions of this move imply that it was successful.
The prime minister listed the names of 14 people who are symbols of diverse religious beliefs and ideological positions and who represent the entire country. While some of them died recently, some are still alive. These names have symbolic importance. An attempt to reach a consensus based on these symbols was perfectly fitting to the democratic initiative process.
There is an accumulated tension deep inside the collective subconscious. This rage, created by desperation, particularly created by economic hardship, must be mitigated. A great majority of people only intend to be busy with their own business in a peaceful environment. The government aims to eliminate this rage and introduce the democratic initiative as a peace project.
The improving economic performance of the country will make things better for the AK Party government. Any policy that is nurtured by rage has no future. Rage is a sentiment. When sentiments wane, reason dominates once again. The society’s search for peace relies on a strong logic and social requirements.
Those who regard October as a critical month for the democratic initiative are right. The government’s strategy is successful. Although there is still no content, significant progress has been made. There are many reasons for being optimistic for the future of the initiative.
