Given that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is preparing a critical democratic initiative, it isn't normal to think that Öcalan's road map has disappeared. More importantly, it appears that Öcalan himself is not complaining about it. Based on my own investigation, I came to the conclusion that Öcalan and government institutions have made an agreement to “consider the road map and include the necessary parts” in the government's Kurdish initiative.It seems that the road map issue is deeper than just Öcalan's wishful expectations of the Turkish government. Let me remind you first about the process of writing the road map, and then I'll try to make sense of what is going on these days. In May, Öcalan announced that he was writing a road map and would finish it by the end of August or the beginning of September. But later, in June and July, it was announced that Öcalan was going to finish his road map and release it on Aug. 15, the day the PKK first launched its struggle against Turkey in 1984. It appears that it was the PKK's plan to declare victory on the anniversary of that day. One can speculate that the Aug. 15 date was suggested by the PKK and the Democratic Society Party (DTP) to declare the victory. It was not in Öcalan's original plan. Of course the image of the PKK declaring victory and the road map being the document for such victory would be not be accepted by the Turkish public.
As a counteroffer, it appears, Turkish officials have suggested and Öcalan seems to agree to find a solution based on the concept of "there is no winner and no loser in this war." Therefore, Öcalan postponed submitting the road map. Perhaps based on this agreement, the road map was submitted to Turkish authorities to consider, or negotiate, with Öcalan and include his suggestion in the AKP's Kurdish initiative and present it as if it were the government's plan. Knowing that it would be hard to convince the Turkish public that the government is negotiating with Öcalan, Turkish authorities seem to negotiate with Öcalan, and Öcalan agrees with it. Perhaps for this very reason, Öcalan was furiously criticizing the DTP and the PKK for not understanding him. The PKK, on the other hand, uses this, the road map argument, as a political tool to highlight its demands.
The critical issue here is how to end the negotiations. Öcalan and some government institutions held negotiations in 2006 and 2007; however, the negotiations failed because of Öcalan's unacceptable demands. Based on this information one can be optimistic about the negotiation process; however, it is still quite fragile and can be broken at any time by any side.
Another critical issue is Öcalan's way of communication with the PKK. Unless Öcalan openly orders PKK militants to lay down their weapons, it would be very difficult to convince PKK members that Öcalan is actually asking them to do just that. On the other hand, if Öcalan openly calls on PKK militants to lay down their arms, it would harm the sprit of the agreement between state officials and Öcalan: No side would be the winner. Such a call would automatically mean that the PKK accepted defeat, which would not be easy for PKK militants and their supporters among Kurdish society. In fact it would not be practical for the government to enforce defeat psychology on the Kurdish community because it is against the foundation of the government's initiative to restore its relations with Kurdish society.
Knowing that restoring relations with defeated, humiliated and suppressed societies is much harder than societies that have not been through such hardships, state officials do not want to impose such a feeling on the Kurdish society. This also requires government officials to cooperate with Öcalan and find a medium amid the deep-rooted wounds and distrust between Kurds and the state apparatus.
Öcalan's road map is in the hands of interested parties in state institutions evaluating the positive and negative sides of the road map and how to insert it into the government's Kurdish initiative. Ironically, the road map now has turned into a useful tool for the government to study and for its angle on the Kurdish initiative.
