However, the government is not of this opinion. The prime minister has stressed that peace can only be attained through dialogue and that soldiers who lost their lives cannot be treated as "ammunition." On the other hand, the opposition has grown more and more fierce and hawkish. It employs all sorts of tactics so that the atmosphere of warfare can be maintained. In a nutshell, the “Kurdish initiative” is a project that the government is trying to implement in spite of its political rivals and the “state.” For this reason, it is very unlikely to be successful if it fails to garner support from the civil society.Still, the support the government needs is more than this. This is because even if the Western world backs it and the Turkish nation approves of it, it is not likely to take steps toward peace without consent from the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The advantage afforded to it by asymmetric warfare means that if the PKK wishes, it can drag out this issue for many years to come. The state's attitude, which will grow harsher during this period, will provide the Kurdish resistance based on armed activism a suitable venue for nourishment and strengthening.
For this reason, the perspective of the PKK leadership is vital for the success of the “Kurdish initiative” and for the eventual settlement of the Kurdish issue. This perspective never favored settlement in the past. If this conflict has been going on for about 30 years, this is not only because of errors committed by the state, but also because of the fact that the PKK feeds on this conflict and defines politics with references to this conflict.
The political strategy of the PKK can roughly be described in terms of three stages. The first stage is the time period between the onset of armed resistance and the military coup of 1997.
The second stage started in the post-1997 period and made non-settlement a “red line” for the PKK. In other words, “non-settlement” came to be perceived by the PKK as a prerequisite for survival. Its leadership realized not only that its military capabilities were diminishing and the armed struggles was not paying off, but also that the international political scene was changing and that northern Iraq was no longer a sure and safe haven. This stalemate forced the PKK to make its choice in the ongoing conflict regarding secularism in Turkey. We started to see ultra “secular” writings by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Then, praise for Kemalism and Mustafa Kemal became the ordinary parlance within the PKK while opposition to European Union membership became a main topic.
The PKK spokesmen claimed that they were actually on the same side as the Turkish army and that the real problem stemmed from Western imperialism, with the country facing the risk of being divided. Parallel to this discourse, they underlined that Shariah (Islamic law) was a great danger for the country and that Islamic fundamentalists would take the country back many centuries. In fact, the PKK had found who it was “really” addressing. It was trying to develop a different relationship of equality with the Turkish army with which it fought, but from which it was no different ideologically. Thus, the matter of who would represent the Kurds could eventually be settled. This was because in an atmosphere where politics was done mutually with “military” institutions and people, there was not much left to be said by Kurdish civilians.
But, the world was traveling in a different direction, and it was no longer possible for Turkey to hold back its democratic demands. Indeed, in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) formed a single-party government, and the PKK went through a transition period after being left in suspense. But, when the Ergenekon network was brought to light, things were reversed. Now there was a country where it was particularly difficult to curb democratic processes and the military no longer had the chance to become a political player or subject, as had been the case in the past. Thus, a PKK that lent support to civilian politics and that sought to engage in politics after laying down arms emerged. Going back in time, the reference used was the 1921 Constitution. This Constitution, which was advertised as being considerably liberal and not discriminating between different identities, was defended, while the 1924 Constitution, which Mustafa Kemal ordered to be drafted and which introduced the Turkish identity as the dominant identity, was described as the "starting point of error."
The PKK leadership seeks to survive, exist and become the main representative of the Kurds. However, the promotion of civilian politics and the possible rivals that this may create do not bother it much. It estimates that it can dominate civilian politics in equal scale.
Today, one of the most critical supports that the government has been able to find is this different perspective of the PKK leadership. Ironically enough, the government, which seeks peace and settlement, has been obstructed by its own bureaucracy while it has the backing of an “enemy” whose sole business is war. The PKK may not be taken as an interlocutor, but it seems that recognizing the PKK's potential to exist as a political player is the key to the solution.
