We witnessed Vanuatu's independence, Ronald Reagan's presidential election, incidents in Çorum, Turkey, and Josip Broz Tito's death, starting a long period of crises in the Balkans. Today, Turkey is still trying to get rid of sequels to the 1980 coup and to repair the damage caused by its institutions and mentality. Twenty-nine years may seem too long for that, but the task is very complicated. In many parts of the world, the transformation of societies is relatively easy because of the accelerating impact of the global system. However, the change in official institutions and mechanisms doesn't follow societies' transformation with the same speed. Because of this delay, in the 1980s some countries fought with each other, like Iran and Iraq; the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan; the Palestinians launched their intifada; and Lebanon was dragged into a civil war. Government mechanisms that remained incompatible with global conditions have caused intergovernmental and social conflicts to continue until today. Turkey's actual anguish about its own transformation can also be observed in the European Union's search for an identity, in the US president's new social policies (for example his health care system reform), in Iraq's restructuring efforts and in Iran's vacillations. But Afghanistan appears to be the most hopeless case.
One of the factors that motivated those who made the Sept. 12 coup a reality was the belief that the USSR also had some plans to transform Turkey into a communist country or to occupy it. The Turkish army had the ability to protect us from this, but since the Afghan people didn't have such an army at their disposal, they have paid a very high price. Nobody thought about that at that time, but the Soviet Union was already having great difficulty controlling its satellite countries, and it did not have the ability to occupy another country, especially not a NATO member. The same illogical fear existed both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, too. As a result, the former plunged into a process of self-destruction, and the latter chose to establish an authoritarian state system.
Even though some Afghans want to correct past mistakes, their efforts won't bring the expected results because the people who benefit from the old system or who want to create the new system according to their own will are also pursuing their struggle. The situation becomes even more complicated when the “Western” powers interfere, and as they are inclined to see every local person as a terrorist, every village as a Taliban camp and every pious Muslim as an al-Qaeda sympathizer, they bomb nearly everything. This reminds us of the time when the Turkish army was convinced that every civilian was a potential “anarchist.” Why is it so hard to learn from the mistakes committed in the 1980s? Why do the “Western” powers, meticulous in exploring new methods to solve their problems, keep applying outdated formulas when it comes to Afghanistan? Turkey still remembers the Sept. 12 coup, and it is trying to dispel its negative impact on Turkish foreign and domestic policies, while NATO faces a combination of our Sept. 12 and the US's Sept. 11 in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, all members don't share the same vision about the necessary steps to be taken there.
