Following a consistent line, he fiercely opposed any “initiative” dealing with the Kurdish issue and disarming the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), attacking not only the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), but also many of the intellectuals and civil society representatives who met the AK Party government's interior minister for consultations. The statement by the National Security Council (MGK) confirming a “go ahead” for the government to shape a plan for Kurdish reform has turned to a new pretext for Bahçeli to lash out not only at the MGK, but also at President Abdullah Gül and the military command.
His tense rhetoric -- touching the borders of slander -- is based on a key word no less fraught than “traitor.” In short, Bahçeli and his circle see treason now on every level of the Turkish state, and warn about the “consequences.”
In a previous article, I tried to analyze the developing -- difficult -- pattern of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), and its leader, Deniz Baykal. In many layers, the MHP's pattern is more visible, predictable, yet it contains murky elements in foreseeing what Bahçeli, at the end of the day, aims for.
To begin, one key element has been clear and proven: both opposition parties would position themselves according to the position taken by the top command. In a previous -- not the last -- MGK meeting, I am told, despite the fact that the military had already displayed a line in favor of the initiative, it was presented in a very brief and reluctant tone. We should read this as a message of “wait and see,” namely the chief of general staff wants to see how the government will outline a “road map” of reform.
It is no secret that the generals want to see a gradual, careful reform within the framework of the current Constitution. That is, no ethnic group rights. Nothing to jeopardize the unitary nature of the republic.
Both opposition leaders, Baykal and Bahçeli, naturally knew about the reluctant attitude of the armed forces and expected to see the last MGK statement before taking a final stand. Baykal somewhat “softened” his tone, leaving open an option to talk to Erdoğan.
What does Bahçeli aim to do? For the MHP leader, a crucial part of the MGK statement, saying “the council supports the further efforts of democratization,” has become a huge disappointment. He had presumably expected a military reaction to what he sees as “crossing the line” by the government, but when he realized that İlker Başbuğ, the top commander, is -- albeit very cautiously -- behind the efforts, he decided to “broaden his front.” To many, his attacks at the military came as a surprise and were seen as “burning bridges with the state,” a sharp turn from the MHP's traditional policies.
This may not be, well, entirely true.
Bahçeli knows the “state” very well, to the point of understanding what parting ways with it would mean for his party. In that sense, his line of reasoning may not have changed.
I would argue that he has two goals: Calculating that the “Kurdish initiative,” when shaped and no matter how it is framed, would lead to polarization around nationalism, Bahçeli has already started his election campaign. He also wants to secure unity within the party as it prepares for its congress in November. He does not want to lose his central role in his side of politics.
Second, no matter how harsh he may be at times, Bahçeli has proven loyal to a functioning Parliament and has shown little sympathy for violence. Though he may have changed his mind about it -- it will certainly depend upon how the Democratic Society Party (DTP) and PKK behave during the efforts -- or not, he wants to keep the monopoly of nationalist reactions. This may come to mean -- and here comes the traditional relations between Bahçeli and the state -- that he aims to keep his hand on the masses, in particular, the youth -- highly unemployed -- to keep them away from the streets. He has vented some sentiments already. It would be naive to think that he has not taken this role into consideration. If not, he may even be asked to keep control of the masses, whenever it is necessary.
The positioning of the opposition (and the maximalist signals from Abdullah Öcalan) shows, clearly enough, how painful the entire process promises to be.
