More and more, suppressing insurgencies by overwhelming force is found to be unproductive and more costly than alternative approaches, as has been proven by multiple examples. The newly devised CI doctrine is built on the synchronized application of combat, security, political, economic, psychological and civic actions. Of course, such diverse activities need to be coordinated across the military, government institutions and civilian agencies.What complicates the matter is the complexity of ethnic and religious insurgencies, which are both ambiguous and multidimensional in character. They take place in a rapidly changing operational environment, and the parties involved are very determined people, if not altogether fanatical. That is why both the use of the information available and the capability to act decisively in response to the new tactics of the adversary are vital for success.
The described methodology is technically called "counterinsurgency campaign design," which can be distinguished from traditional military planning. In conventional military wisdom, planning applies established procedures to solve a problem within an accepted framework. However, in the realm of counterinsurgency, “design” requires research into the nature of a problem in order to conceive a framework that will solve a problem.
Through “design” efforts, the armed forces of a country attempt to bridge the gap between adaptive and generative learning. “Adaptive” learning focuses on problem solving, disregarding the manner in which indigenous organizations define and solve problems. It focuses on the directions of incremental change and is driven by official logic. On the other hand, “generative” learning challenges the formal organizations' structure and their problem-solving methods, as well as the institutional culture that may contradict the socio-cultural reality in which it operates. It fosters continual experimentation, reassessment of facts and organizational learning that keeps it flexible and functional in a rapidly changing environment.
The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) did not heed generative learning to a great extent. Its institutional character is built on system maintenance, even when the system became dysfunctional with regards to its mission statement: national unity, stability and order. On the other hand, the US military is beset by another handicap: it has placed far more importance on and provided far greater funding for technical systems. It focused on the management of integrated information technology systems such as networks, servers, storage systems, databases and basic communications software. This emphasis on the technical aspect of command and control has neglected the need to create a more adaptive and learning organization.
Following the Iraqi and Afghan experiences, the Americans came to understand how little they knew about the social networks and cultural trends in which they operated. This made their task even harder and counterproductive. Now they know that the established culture of military command and control needs to evolve. They know that just having the technical capabilities of command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) is not enough. Successful CI operations require a transformation in institutional culture to facilitate the active sharing of information by all parties involved, dynamic communication, collaboration and collective learning as an integral part of the CI process.
It is not easy, but success in CI requires the adoption of an attitude that will set into motion a set of processes and practices to maximize the value of knowledge. This knowledge should be distilled through constant information gathering and processing.
Unlike people, formal organizational structures, especially highly hierarchical military ones, rarely have the capacity to learn easily. In the military, it is noted that form often precedes function. New units and task groups are created with little thought of how these groups' various functions will interact or whether their products or actions will be mutually supportive. It is often the case that a holistic view of the battle and battlefield conditions is missing. Once the new units and task forces are in place, an attempt is made to shape the processes to fit the structure.
CI “campaign design” requires a suitable culture and suitable procedures through which problems are identified and analyzed objectively, not obfuscated by institutional culture or ideology. The new institutional culture must be conducive to reflection and innovation, even in a high-gear theater of operations. Unfortunately, neither the unaccountable and untouchable TSK nor the US armed forces, with so many intellectual, material and technological resources at hand, were able to develop this capacity. Why? Perhaps the answer lies in human nature: in order to learn new things, old things must be unlearned. Changing mental models, personal habits of perceiving, thinking and acting and our relationships with others is harder than we think. It is even harder for institutions, the existence of which relies on them.
