He would make public his road map on Aug. 15 and would wait for military operations to end by Sept. 15. Öcalan's road map created a certain level of expectation, particularly among Kurds. These expectations created the impression that the government's "democratization initiative" would be a process that will make progress with road maps.Accordingly, a road map would first be drawn and then targets would be specified. An agreement on a timeline would be made and eventually everyone would set on this road. A road map is frequently associated with agreed-upon principles and programs. First we will come together and reach an agreement and then we will take action. Is this true? Yes. But is it possible? Isn't the following proverb common to Kurdish and Turkish nomads closer to reality: "Turks/Kurds sort things out while traveling"? This proverb implies that travelers would complete their preparations after taking to the road. What is this thing that we call a road map? Don't we all know all these roads by heart?
Those anxiously waiting for Öcalan's road map will end up with a great disappointment. This is because Öcalan will not tell us anything new and will even come up as a person who has wavered from most of his previous demands. Now, try to visualize the preparations that will be sorted out on the road. Camels carry the heaviest load for travel. A camel's load must be carefully balanced. It follows that we will need to establish a balance and find an authority that will help us do and maintain this.
Objective and subjective conditions
Öcalan is using a communications strategy. Having spent 10 years in jail, the leader of a terrorist organization can be expected to act more like a theoretician. Thus, what he can do best is develop a strategy based on an "analysis of objective and subjective conditions," a standard tool for Marxists. Let me simplify this in order to introduce the tools of analysis available to Öcalan and to understand better the road map he will disclose. Objective conditions consist of the external framework that we cannot change and that exceeds our will. The US is pulling out from Iraq. Turkey is becoming stronger in the balance of powers in the Middle East. This change does not allow much room for the Kurdish political movement to flourish. A Kurdish political movement that resorts to violence can inflict damage on its opponents by destroying itself. It is madness to go on with a war with no winner and with no political purpose, as Carl von Clausewitz defines it. On the other hand, in order to fill the newly emerging gap and instill order inside the country, Turkey is obliged to come to terms with its own Kurds and the Kurds in northern Iraq. Subjective conditions consist of decisions and actions by the agents who interact or fight with each other. One has to be realistic in order to take objective conditions into consideration and be bold in order to act according to subjective conditions. Objective conditions enforce peace, but can our subjective will be capable of implementing it?
The president's statement that "good things will happen" has come to serve as a turning point. Statements voiced by the government so far have shown that we are making irrevocable progress. Kurds are hopeful. By assessing the objective and subjective conditions, Öcalan is trying to mitigate the Kurds' share of the load on the camel and pave the way for further progress. He is offering not tactics, but a strategic total withdrawal. His road map will contain the outlines of this strategic withdrawal.
The fact that "democratic confederalism" has been replaced by "democratic municipalism" through a series of moderate local administration reforms is a sign of this withdrawal. Furthermore, during his last meeting with his lawyers, Öcalan defined himself as not being a "separatist," an explicit reference to the wording the state uses to describe the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). His formulation of the issue as a "matter of honor" should be regarded as his attempt to further mitigate the burden. Öcalan's capability of theoretical analysis, including his success in giving himself a pivotal role in the settlement of the Kurdish issue, should be acknowledged.
Beyond the current debates, Öcalan seems to have decided to play a role in facilitating the steps the government will take.
Road map of political calculations
The political density per square centimeter of the grounds politicians from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) occupy must be about 50 times greater than those of other parliamentary parties. The DTP's politicians who argue that Öcalan must be accepted as a direct side to the issue are running after their own political interests within the complicated structure of the PKK. The current state of the DTP implies that serious debates are being conducted within the party and with major disagreements. Even the suggestion to eliminate violence has helped pluralize Kurdish politics. A pluralized Kurdish politics signifies the pluralization of the settlement.
However, there is an accumulation on the other side. After a few statements supporting the settlement, the Republican People's Party (CHP) has come to imitate the harsh opposition pursued by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a clear sign of this accumulation. It follows that they still expect political benefits by opposing settlement efforts. But can they really gain some benefits in doing so? Will the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) electoral support diminish with every move it takes? The fact that the CHP has volunteered to grab a share of this pie the MHP has been claiming to command is proof that it may. Party leaders always measure electoral tendencies. Then we can conclude that settlement will lead to a drop in electoral support while opposing settlement will boost votes. Yes, but will these calculations hold true? Can we solve the gangrenous Kurdish issue in the shade of these political calculations?
The democratization initiative should be a national issue going beyond party politics. Accusations of treason voiced at a time when only the method of settlement is being discussed and there is still no substance to the settlement have eliminated the possibility of dialogue. The indecision of the CHP can be regarded as the reigning supreme of a lack of settlement as initially advocated by the MHP. Yet, there is a paradox to this lack of settlement. That is: A lack of settlement is no settlement. Whatever you call it, there is a major issue in Turkey. It is not sufficient to raise an objection to every move taken by the AK Party; instead, one is supposed to offer an alternative solution. If one cannot, he will start to lose electoral support.
The AK Party has volunteered to shoulder a great political burden. There is a risk of being crushed under it. But there is also a possibility of big political gains. The road map is being decided by the political topography of Turkey. A political course that will be similar to the mountainous geography of Turkey will be taken while this issue is being solved. The road map will be shaped by the necessities of this political geography and not by a single person or a limited number of people. It is the duty of the government to act as a pathfinder on this winding road to settlement.
Öcalan's road map will apparently be based on the analysis of objective conditions and be a realistic one. It is likely that Öcalan will retreat in order to jump-start a wave of sympathy on the issue. Once that happens, we only have to wait for the rage pumped forth by the MHP to settle. Subjective conditions imply that this rage will make the MHP lose many things in the medium term; therefore, it will backpedal. Then, the solution rests completely on the skill and resolution the AK Party will wield.
