This one also calls, as expected, a spade a spade. Fifty-two people, among them two retired four-star generals, four former rectors, academics, etc., are accused of plotting a coup d'état by creating chaos through acts of terror.At the core of the accusations are coup plans and diaries of a former naval commander, Özden Örnek.
Furthermore, two events are of extreme importance: The decision by a court that the attack at the Council of State be included in the Ergenekon case as well as the less known but utterly explosive Atabeyler case (a murder plot against the prime minister by officers).
Despite rather irrational skepticism in the domestic arena and in some circles in the international domain, the huge case develops further, penetrating into the higher levels, increasing the likelihood that more ex-commanders will be put on trial for seeking to overthrow the constitutional order.
What made me even more skeptical of all those who have been skeptical about the Ergenekon trial is an element I argued for when discussing the inevitably serious nature of the trial. It is now on the record, made public, and confirms the lethal essence of what the prosecutors are dealing with.
I am talking about the testimony of the key witness: Hilmi Özkök, former chief of general staff who was subjected to attempts to have him ousted and widespread smear campaigns in the militarist segment of the media for being “too soft” on the elected government.
Özkök was questioned at length some months ago and disclosed what he knew (as much as he wanted to tell, certainly) about the subversive activities at the military headquarters and about his work to uncover them.
In the indictment, the former top commander reveals several points: that he was given some materials showing that some commanders were in joint activity to topple the government; that he had rejected a “joint memorandum” in late 2003 signed by all his wing commanders; that he had warned the then-gendarmerie commander, Şener Eruygur (a top figure among the suspects), to stop whatever he was doing; and he had also let Eruygur's right-hand man, Col. Levent Ersöz, know that he knew that the gendarmerie was “tapping” even his telephone conversations and should cease to do so immediately.
Asked why he did not go any further and take legal action against all those responsible in his office, Özkök -- a well-known legalist -- told the Radikal daily yesterday that there were two complications: First, sources of all the e-copies he was given on coup plans were impossible to identify (they were marked as X or Y instead of signatures and no IP addresses were found), and since the administrative (and not the operative) part of the gendarmerie was in the Interior Ministry, he was facing difficulties exposing the responsible gendarmerie officers. (The latter can also be explained as Özkök not wanting to be seen cooperating with a “disliked” government against his subordinate officers.)
Özkök's testimony clarifies (and should disperse skepticism) that there was ongoing activity in the years 2003 and 2004; and certainly his four-star generals, against his will, were more than willing to stage a coup -- or, at least, create a set of conditions that would paralyze the government, as we saw happen in 1997 when the Necmettin Erbakan-led coalition became defunct following a series of threatening military steps.
The rest of the indictment also contains accusations on some horrifying episodes of crime in recent Turkish history: It establishes links between the network and the murder of prominent businessman Özdemir Sabancı, arguing that some elements within a violent leftist group were acting as “hit men” in the name of Ergenekon. It even claims that the burning of some 30 Alevi intellectuals in the city of Sivas in the early 1990s was the work of the organization. Certainly, there is much more in the swollen file.
Despite the risk of being “spread” too much, and despite counter-propaganda by its sympathizers, the case against Ergenekon will go further. We will certainly find out more when the first hearing of the third stage takes place early next month. There will most likely be fourth and fifth (and maybe even more) additions.
The success depends on four elements: that the prosecutors have strong enough evidence, that the judges of the case act without the pressure of anti-democratic circles within the state apparatus, that the heavily ideologized Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) not interfere with the case and, when it goes up to that level, that the Supreme Court of Appeals judges it fairly, with “protection of democracy” in mind.
