Ask Kurds now and they will tell.However much cynics may attempt to ridicule it, however much those who in those dark times acted as accomplices to try to suppress it, one should give in to the fact a kind of Turkish “glasnost” is underway on the Kurdish question. You know, a kind of “beginning of the beginning.”
It is now beyond the point of this or that politician simply admitting “the reality of the Kurds” or the “Kurdish problem” or something similar. With the current initiative cautiously launched by the government, the republic, for the first time, pledges that it will solve this chronic illness.
Turkish glasnost means that Kurds come forth even more candidly, without fear, to talk about their past agony. Haşim Haşimi, a former mayor (from the list of center right parties) of Cizre in the '90s, for example, says that “nobody could know for certain how many Kurds were actually killed in the period during which Col. Cemal Temizöz served, maybe hundreds.” Temizöz, as we know, served as a local gendarmerie officer, allegedly linked with the JITEM structures of the time, conducting a dirty war.
More powerful narratives are expected in the future, making it a necessity that a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation be formed without much delay.
Ironically, it was those times that were a relief for the political parties and the governments they built, particularly after the death of Özal. Relief in a sense that on one side of Kurdish politics was the state and its security forces and on the other, the armed rebels of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Beginning with Tansu Çiller, prime ministers gave the go ahead to the military to do “whatever is necessary to break the backbone of the terrorists” and, indeed, whatever came to mind was done. It made apathy and amnesia a common way of acting for the politician: He or she simply repeated what was said in his or her ear.
Now, the hard part begins. Glasnost means the adoption of a diverse, engaging and challenging language, and, consequently, the dilemma of adopting a “real” political line. That Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan today meets Ahmet Türk, leader of the Pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), is a signal in that direction. And, in general, that is why the actors of the main opposition feel the necessity of taking a new position in their spine. Robot talks will not apply anymore.
The Republican People's Party (CHP) is yet to decide. As usual, it will wait and calculate when to react in order to let the AK Party policies shape its own. It will be a painful process, because the CHP is already in the midst of an identity crisis; there is no sign that any member of its leadership realizes how damaging this glasnost could be for the party.
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) is, perhaps as a surprise for many, including myself, already set for dark waters. Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the party, was very harsh in condemning the “Kurdish initiative,” equating it to treason. But, in a sign that should cause concern, he went beyond a classic negative labeling.
According to him, there would be MHP members ready if the state forces were to retreat from the “mountains” (from the fight against the PKK). He accused the journalists and opinion columnists who took part in the “Kurdish workshop” under the auspices of the Police Academy in Ankara in a fashion which most of them took as an open threat for their lives.
What does this positioning mean? The surprise is that Bahçeli was acting as a responsible politician during the presidential crisis and always marked his stand as a pro-democracy actor. The latest outburst is, therefore, a deviation from the soft line, and sets the alarm levels high, since it may -- for the first time -- bring forth the risks of civilian unrest and community violence, between nationalist Turks and Kurds. It is difficult to tell whether Bahçeli has the increasing unemployment as an advantage for his attack. If so, he is playing a very delicate game.
At this stage, the focus will be on how these main actors will behave. The army is pulling out of the political arena, where it was a primary player, and dangers are already apparent; desperation for votes may tempt parties like the MHP, and even the CHP to radicalize their discourse. Unfortunately, it may not finish there. That is how it started in former Yugoslavia.
