Then it could not but accept them all. Yet it took years to name the issue at hand. Finally, it was described as the “Kurdish question” in 2005 by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his trip to Diyarbakır. Now we are talking about a “Kurdish solution.” This is a huge step forward given the slow-changing nature of “state policies” in Turkey.
For the first time, a meeting was held in a state institution discussing the Kurdish question and searching for parameters of a solution. The meeting was organized and hosted by the Police Academy in Ankara and attended by 15 journalists and academics. Moreover, Interior Minister Beşir Atalay, in charge of the Kurdish initiative, joined the meeting, attentively taking notes throughout the meeting, which lasted in five hours.
As far as I remember it was the first “official” meeting that called the problem by the right name: “Solving the Kurdish Question: Toward a Turkish model.” Though the Police Academy is an academic entity and declared that it organized the meeting in this capacity, it is clearly linked to the Interior Ministry. Therefore, the organization of the “Kurdish workshop” was another sign of the changing state policy toward the Kurdish question.
It is also extremely important to note that such a workshop -- with this title -- was organized by the higher education institution of one branch of the Turkish security forces that has been fighting against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The academy and its new president, Professor Zuhtu Arslan, should be congratulated for this courageous and visionary initiative.
In the workshop, the underlying theme was that greater democratization and respect for ethnic diversities is the key to resolving the question, and a sort of truce and commitment to lay down arms is essential to start and sustain the “solution process.” There was also an overwhelming consensus on the urgency of solving the Kurdish question at this juncture that provides all parties with windows of opportunity. I also emphasized that the unresolved Kurdish question is a burden for Turkey and for its citizens, the Kurds and the Turks alike, and as such the country cannot afford it.
To summarize the discussions in the workshop in a sentence, “An honorable solution for the state, the Turks and the Kurds is possible, and it will come through recognition and participation within a unified Turkey.”
In this context, the government's Kurdish initiative may be an opportunity to enhance democracy, which is declared by Minister Atalay as the means to resolve the Kurdish question. This is so because the unnamed “Kurdish question” has always been used as an excuse to postpone fully establishing a liberal democracy. It goes back to 1925, when the multiparty regime of the new Turkish Republic was interrupted by Sheikh Said's Kurdish rebellion, establishing a single-party rule that lasted until 1945. Even after Turkey's return to multiparty politics, the Kurdish question was what the military exploited to sustain its grip on Turkish politics and society. In short “securitization” of Turkish politics and society was made possible by the presentation of the Kurds as the “danger,” the separatist group. The Ergenekon-like “deep state” formation was also formed and used against this “danger,” which justified its existence and unlawful activities.
Therefore, the “Kurdish peace” will cleanse Turkey, depriving the authoritarian elements of the biggest excuse to keep the people “hostage” in fear of the “Kurdish threat.” State-centric, top-down, authoritarian policies will lose one of their important pillars after the settlement of the Kurdish question.
Thus finding a solution to the Kurdish question is not risk free. Those elements in Turkey that have benefited from the Kurdish question, both among the Kurds and the Turks, in civil society and the state apparatus, may do the most they can to avert the process. Therefore, those who have the wisdom for a solution should come together, disregarding their political, ethnic, social and economic differences.
In this context, the responsibility, risks and benefits should not be left to the governing party only. If those who are in favor of a solution do not rally behind the initiative, the government alone may refrain from taking initial risks to address the question with electoral concerns.
What is more is that while Turkey is doing its part addressing the Kurdish question, the PKK should also be persuaded to lay down its arms. In this Turkey will need its Western allies as well as Iraq's Kurdish leaders to push the PKK to lay down its arms.
