Or the Kurdish problem is used as an alibi to keep this dysfunctional and anachronistic system that provides a lack of accountability and limitless social and economic privileges to a ruling cadre -- mainly of a a bureaucratic nature -- that sees itself as the “guardians of the republic” or the “constitutive elite.”After decades of internal strife (since the beginning of the republic) and a civil war carried on for the past quarter of a century, the public administration and public opinion have converged on the need for a solution. Mind you, this convergence is neither on the definition of the problem nor on measures to deal with it. Yet the positive psychological aura in the making led to widespread comfort and expectations among the populace and official institutions.
Many of these institutions have opposed a “civilian” or civic solution to the Kurdish problem before. They tried anything and everything to “solve” (!) the matter, from mass murders and collective torture to cross-border operations. These methods not only hardened the opponents and justified the armed militia's uprising but also internationalized the Kurdish issue by creating a united (or at least affiliated) “Kurdish front” in authoritarian Middle Eastern countries hosting Kurdish enclaves. The means used to deal with the problem created a monster far beyond the vicissitude of the problem in its initial phase. Now, neither this government nor any other can easily and completely solve it with the methods so far envisioned and with the instruments of the nation-state.
What can be done? There are things that Turkey can do at least to put an end to ongoing fratricide and to normalize a regime infested and hardened by its security-oriented mentality. The first step is to start with a clear definition of the problem. It must be comprehensive and holistic, as the complexity of the issue requires. The problem we face is not only economic poverty, high unemployment, inefficient business concerns, low educational levels and discrimination against women due to traditionalism; it is also a matter of decentralization of administration, dissociation of citizenship from ethnic affiliation and accepting the legal equality of all cultures and cultural groups that has to be followed by practices consonant with legal changes like education in local languages other than Turkish. This comes down to altering the formulation of a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural nation in favor of a pluralist one neutral to ethnic and religious differences run mainly by civic actors generated locally rather than centrally. Are the political and bureaucratic cadres that have so far enjoyed being the omnipotent users of state power ready for such a fundamental change? For “their state” will no more be “theirs” and they will not be able to shape the nation and the nature of things any more when the state apparatus becomes transparent and state functionaries accountable. This goes for political parties who see their mission as hoarding their supporters under the wings of the state and providing largess (read this as support, protection and economic favors) in return for their obedience. It will be hard and it will take time. But change will be revolutionary.
That is the reason why the government will first deal with issues to end violence rather than solving the yet-undefined Kurdish problem. It is only normal that the “Kurdish problem” can be solved or at least tensions can be eased by meeting the basic needs and expectations of the Kurdish people of Turkey. There is a clear party to the problem at this level. But what about the armed wing of the problem, which draws blood and is not supported by two-thirds of the Kurds? They have carried on an effective armed campaign for a quarter of a century and are not yet defeated. It is more obvious that the organization must be defused rather than defeated. Now the leader of the armed Kurdish organization (Kurdistan Workers' Party [PKK]), who has been in a Turkish jail for the past 10 years, has declared that in order to satisfy public expectations he will declare a “roadmap” by mid-August with his plan to end hostilities.
It was after this declaration that the dormant state machinery came to life following decades of incorrect decisions and untargeted implementations and began to work on its own “roadmap.” How could a government be guided by a terrorist organization? The question is right, but what about the answer? Why did the whole bureaucratic and political machinery wait until the terrorist organization and its leader proposed peace? Where were you?
The answer is simple, because the Turkish political system is both relatively autonomous of the popular will and the state's main reflex is self-sustenance rather than serving the people that gave birth to it. Now the roles must be reversed, and the state machinery and personnel must be both responsive to and responsible for their deeds and decisions. That is the origin of the problem. The “Kurdish problem” has reminded us of the nature of the system that neither serves nor protects. It seems we will owe Turkish democracy to the Kurds!
