Therefore, it is no coincidence that Interior Minister Beşir Atalay referred to during yesterday's press conference the government's new measures to address the Kurdish problem, calling the new measures “a democratic opening.” Nevertheless, Atalay has still fallen short of disclosing what the new package contains.
The Kurdish package is understood to discuss reforms necessary to ease the Kurdish economic as well as cultural plight while refocusing on more democratic rights for the country in general.
But the initial reactions to Atalay's statement as well as to earlier remarks about a possible Kurdish solution by the two opposition parties, the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), show that the deep divide among political actors continues to block the earlier breakthroughs to the problem.
Opposing political actors fail to display an intellectual and thoughtful response to the necessity of breaking the stalemate in regards to the Kurdish issue, which will lessen the danger of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and the ill-defined policies of some state institutions. However, the reality is that there has been a deepening Kurdish identity crisis which can be averted through courageous measures taken by the government.
Yet, despite the government's goodwill in addressing the Kurdish problem, it does not seem that the PKK problem is well understood or that the political courage exists to deal with the issue.
If the government designs bold economic measures that will ease unemployment, which greatly affects the war-stricken Kurdish-dominated Southeast, and offers Kurds more cultural rights, this will at least ease the tension for the next few years until the country deals with more sensitive topics such as amendments to the military-dictated 1982 Constitution to embrace all citizens, regardless of ethnic identity. Currently, Kurds represent the biggest ethnic group in Turkey.
The Turkish state, in the meantime, is aware that Iraqi Kurds in nearby northern Iraq have been moving gradually towards independence, though Ankara has been trying to influence this process so that it can be delayed. The state is also aware that a Kurdish-Arab fight is imminent if the Iraqi central authority does not take measures to accommodate Kurdish concerns such as sharing oil wealth by adopting a hydrocarbon law that will meet Kurdish demands. The fragmentation between the Sunnis in Iraq on the one hand and the Shiites and the Kurds on the other stands as a serious danger for Turkey, too, since Iraq will become a place for confrontation for countries such as Shiite Iran and Sunni-dominated countries like Saudi Arabia. In addition, a possible Iraqi fragmentation will further deepen Turkey's Kurdish identity crisis.
Thus, part of Turkey's new efforts to ease the Kurdish problem involves adopting more democratic rights.
However, at this stage, Turkey's priority is not the introduction of a general amnesty, though it is widely regarded as an important step in lessening the threat of the PKK while easing the Kurdish problem. Unlike Turkish press reports which state that senior PKK members will be allowed to find sanctuary in other countries while young PKK militants will be allowed to return home once they lay down their arms as part of a general amnesty, the Turkish state seems unlikely to adopt such a measure, at least in the coming years.
On the contrary, Turkey renewed its stance during a tri-party (a US team was also at the gathering) meeting held in Ankara on Monday, demanding that Iraq should arrest and return senior PKK members to Turkey.
While Turkey has been seeking their extradition, it views press reports on general amnesty irrelevant and not realistic.
At this stage, though the Turkish state sees serious negative implications to another postponement of a solution to the Kurdish problem, it does not appear to be able to take bold and courageous steps, at least in the short term. But Turkey has entered into an irreversible course in finding a solution to the Kurdish problem.
