These words come from a three-day interview with Yaşar Kemal, a great Turkish author who is almost as old as the republic itself. I have known him as “uncle” (he was a close friend of my late uncle) and have had to follow his plight over the decades to explain his people's problems to Turkey's rather selfish and indifferent middle class and his fight, which often took place in courtrooms and under threat of jail time.A few days after the interview with Kemal, a court sentenced Leyla Zana to 15 months in prison for “spreading the propaganda of terrorist organization.” She had used words of praise when speaking of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) while in London.
This may not come as a surprise to some. Legal practices in Spain, for example, in the context of the ETA, tell us that there must be clear limits for the sublimation of violence, even if conducted in the name of an ideology or a religion. But Zana case, like others with pending or already delivered verdicts, must remain a strong reminder of how extremely delicate the “Kurdish process” will be in Turkey.
If, due to total fatigue, the parties now feel they will have to jump ship in finding a solution, a lot will depend on what sort of responsible behavior they will display. Given the suffering, poverty, ideological differences, senses of “urgency” and infiltration of provocateurs, the Kurdish side will be under scrutiny.
Was there anything new in what Kemal told our colleagues? After years of endless debate, official robot talk and fierce media resistance, what can be new? The “guidebook to a solution” is, as it were, complete in public memory. All that is required is skillful management of conflict resolution.
But, as I touched upon in earlier articles, the key element is that before launching the “process” for real, its “modality” must be very clear.
The key issue is whether or not Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the PKK, will be an interlocutor, directly or by proxy, in the “process.” If he will have to be, at what stages?
One may easily presume that in two to three weeks' time there will be two narratives on the “process.” Regarding rights, what Ankara presents may not be, in essence, very different from what Öcalan will release from his jail cell.
While Ankara is now to a large extent decided on extending individual rights, Öcalan and the political wing of the PKK, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), will put much heavier emphasis on group rights and focus on a rewriting of the Constitution. Realism will be confronted by tough demands based on idealism.
Who “leads” the cause of the Kurdish identity? The true confrontation will not be on the content; it will be on who the interlocutor will be.
It poses a huge dilemma for the government. As agreed upon even by Kemal, Ankara -- by itself -- can launch a large reform package and set in motion a new dynamic. Would such a new phase have an effect on Öcalan, the PKK and the DTP if they are not “talked to”? That the PKK has the leverage to undermine (even if this means further destruction for Kurds and the region) a launched reform process is well known.
Therefore, the prospective obstacle of the interlocutor issue must be pre-empted. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan “allows” the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) Kurdish deputies to indulge in deep talks with DTP deputies, with clear instructions of a lengthy road map, progress can be made.
Even then, would the PKK and the DTP let go of “amnesty and the release of Öcalan”? This is the murkiest part of the interlocutor problem, making it even more complex.
That is why careful planning is absolutely needed.
