The tutelage system in question is being exposed, and for the first time ever, the military is suffering an irreparable loss of prestige. We could say that this process was prompted by European Union reforms. But the real factor was the presence of a pro-religious conservative party in power and the military's panic that this ruling power would not be removed through elections. Although this panic resulted in the Ergenekon coup attempt, the recently discovered General Staff document reveals that the quest for illegitimate political activities continues. These circumstances have led us into a period in which any effort by the military backfires and every dimension of the military tutelage regime is open to debate. This is why the General Staff decided to cancel their weekly press conferences “for now.” They did not want to encounter “unpleasant” questions.
In the wake of this hectic agenda, a study released by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) named “Almanac Turkey 2006–2008: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight” sheds light on the scope of the issue at hand. When we look at the study as a whole we see that the military has two targets concerning the political structure.
One is to create a sphere for itself and to exercise maximum autonomy. The military first tried to attain this with the Constitution drafted in 1960 and then reinforced it with the 1971 and 1980 coups. Protected by the law, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) even managed to secure advantages in the economy and exempt itself from civilian supervision. Even today, the Court of Accounts cannot audit military expenditures and the State Supervisory Council does not have authority to monitor the military. This has created a “state within a state,” and no civilian power has the right to interfere in the TSK's preferences and decisions, But that was not all. The military's autonomy was placed under legal guarantee with a minor change to democracy. In democracies, every institution is subject to supervision, and in the final instance, this function is referred to the judiciary thereby making it inevitable for military personnel to face the judiciary when necessary.
But in Turkey there is a military judicial system that serves the entire military hierarchy. As a result of the Military High Administrative Court and the Military Court of Appeals, there is a dual legal system in Turkey. Moreover, since the military judiciary exists within the military hierarchy and since any soldier facing prosecution must be tried by a judge that has a higher rank, the chief of general staff and the deputy chief of general staff have judicial immunity. But again, ensuring the military's autonomy did not stop with that. According to a bylaw prepared by the military, the military is responsible for “protecting” the republic and the regime. In addition to this bold job description, they believe they are the “real” owners of the official ideology and regime. This is how an institution and institutional political strategy that received absolutely no public approval came into being. The main reason why this strategy is considered despotism is because asymmetric civilian-military relations were made legitimate owing to the support of the military by a certain segment of society. There is no need to mention that this support of the military was given by the secular segment of society and that many “natural” advantages were created in the economic field.
The TSK's second basic target is to control civilian politics according to its own interests. In a Turkey, where everything ranging from education to industrial incentives is a matter of “national security,” civilian politics is bound to remain a sphere that is controlled by the military. For example, all ministries are required to make and implement decisions that comply with “national security policies.” But even this has not been enough to satisfy the TSK. Take, for example, the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order (EMASYA), which the ruling power in 1997 was forced to approve. The protocol allows military operations to be carried out for internal security matters under certain conditions without a request from civilian authorities thereby making even the police force dependant on the military. This protocol not only led to the creation of a permanent structure in particular in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country but also established centralist domination over the public sphere.
In conclusion, Turkey has a military structure that limits and sets the ideological, legal and strategic efforts of civilian politics and that is exempt from civilian political supervision. And until this situation is completely reversed, no reform in Turkey will be successful.
