Turkish officials are also understood to have been sharing worldwide concerns that the Iranian elections have been rigged and may not reflect the true outcome as a result.
Nevertheless, for Turkey, Mousavi's election would have been much better as it would have meant dealing with a more moderate figure. However, it is also a fact that the basic differences between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi have been that the former is outspoken, creating worldwide tension, while the latter could have pursued a quieter form of diplomacy, helping Iran to earn a more respected position at the international level.
Otherwise, Mousavi, if elected, would not have pursued policies different in essence to Ahmadinejad; for example, on the alleged uranium enrichment activities in the quest for atomic weapons. Mousavi should not have been expected to compromise completely on Tehran's nuclear activities but could have pretended to be more collaborative with the international community.
Historically, Iran's aim to become a nuclear power dates back a long time to the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi, and having an almost 5,000-year history, this country has always had a policy of becoming a powerful nation -- but not through improving democracy, rather through the possession of destructive weapons such as nuclear arms.
On Iran's nuclear standoff with the international community, Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, thus, differ tactically but not in essence. At the end of the day, the Iran's Guardian Council is the final decision-making body in Iran.
However, Mousavi's relatively moderate stance could have eased Turkey's job of reducing tension in its environs. It will also be remembered that during Mousavi's tenure as prime minister and foreign minister of Iran at different times, Tehran refused to cooperate with Turkey in the fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) finding sanctuary in Iran.
But changes in the world have also dictated changes in the mindset of countries like inward-looking Iran that can be cited as a factor in Tehran's cooperation with Ankara in the fight against the PKK under Ahmadinejad.
Turkey's improved relations with Iran in the past several years, meantime, reflects the Turkish policy of reducing tensions with all its neighbors while it also reflects Ankara's rationality in dealing with difficult neighbors, creating a mechanism for direct dialogue to understand its neighbors in the search for solutions to contentious issues.
But the Turkish political authority's failure to make a breakthrough in its relations with Armenia, bowing to both internal as well as Azeri pressures, stands as one of the factors implicit in the tension between Iran and Turkey in bilateral ties. Iran enjoys good relations with Armenia, and the absence of a dialogue between Ankara and Yerevan, for example, plays into the hands of Tehran.
There is also a need for Western powers and Israel to be more convincing in their concerns that Iran has been developing nuclear arms. They should abandon setting deadlines to prove Iran's possession of such weapons, as more than 11 years have passed since such deadlines were set but the accusations have never turned out to be true, although this does not mean that Iran does not have a plan to develop nuclear arms, mainly to assert its power in the region and in the world.
An Iran possessing nuclear arms is not only a threat to the region but to Turkey, too.
