Foreign minister as a philosopher (2)

At this point, I would like to tell you an interesting anecdote. After the 2002 elections, actress Hülya Avşar was talking about politics on a TV program. When asked which party she supported, she replied, "The AK Party." The person who asked the question was apparently surprised and asked the reason why. I will never forget Avşar's response: "I voted for [Recep Tayyip] Erdoğan because I believe that he is a lucky guy. Before he became the mayor of İstanbul, the city was longing for rains. After he was elected the mayor, rain started to pour in abundance."

The government's request for approval on March 1, 2003  was a good example. At the time, Erdoğan, as the chairman of the AK Party, talked to the deputies from his party before the parliamentary voting [on sending Turkish troops into Iraq and allowing foreign forces to use Turkey as a base for operations] in order to convince them to support the government's request, saying that if they didn't, they could not pay the salaries of the civil servants. Indeed, the government had prepared the request and sent it to Parliament for final approval. But, despite the fact that majority of the deputies supported it, it was rejected because it failed to meet the quorum needed for approval.

This saved the AK Party from the wrath of the Bush administration, but at the same time, it gave Turkey the prestige of being a country who could say “no” to the US. Perhaps, this result was the reward for sincere and troubled efforts to find a solution to this dilemma. The considerably risky developments with respect to the Cyprus issue, too, ended up with favorable results for the government. The AK Party had decided to take radical steps by departing from the policy of non-settlement that the country had been following for many years, and did not leave the table until it took the Annan Plan to referendum. Actually, there were risks involved in this plan. It was obvious that Turks would say “yes” to the plan, but the position of the Greek Cypriots toward the plan was uncertain. If they, too, had accepted the plan, then some undesirable developments, such as the pulling out of the Turkish soldiers from the island and some Turks' evacuating their homes, would have followed. At that time, I had chatted with Davutoğlu, who had listed six scenarios that might possibly follow and the action plans they had developed for each of them.

But, the outcome of the referendum turned out to be favorable for those who took these risks. Turks said yes, Greek Cypriots no. For the first time in history, Turkey won the title of being the constructive side that is seeking settlement. The Greeks were found to be the real deserters from the solution. As the plan could not be implemented, the Turkish government was saved from its unfavorable consequences.

Obviously, in the future, historians will have chances to make more coolheaded and objective assessments about these issues. Nevertheless, Professor Davutoğlu certainly has a great role in ensuring that Turkish foreign policy could develop a unique language in such dangerous and shadowy issues and become respected in the international circles from Washington to Paris, or from London to Moscow. The war on Iraq, the tensions between Syria and Israel, the tension between Iran and the Gulf and the Kirkuk issue were all well-known crises. By developing and pursuing a well-wrought policy toward these issues, he has managed to make Turkey a respectable player in the Middle East, where it was historically ignored.

Perhaps because they, too, are aware of his performance, the papers in the Western and Eastern worlds felt the need to use the attribute "Turkish [Henry] Kissinger" in reference to Davutoğlu when he was appointed as the foreign minister. The Saudi al-Riyadh paper used the titled "Turkey's Kissinger" for him and said that he ensured that Turkey could play important roles in the international arena. It noted his shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Syria for peace in the Middle East.