Ruling in disarray

And, worst of all, precious time is passing; the ruthless clock of politics is ticking, warning of yet another demise of a powerful political force.

To outside observers, who Andrew Finkel described eloquently as "addicts of instability" (in Turkey's reality), this may come as a no surprise, but the fatigue of déjà vu in the task promises no optimism at the moment.

The results of the local elections confirmed, as it were, the deep divides of a country in the midst of an identity crisis. Some suggest the divides are even deeper than any time in the past, with sociopolitical fault lines placing Kurds on their own, insisting upon politics based on ethnic identity (and a demand thereof); the pious segment being pushed inland from the coastline; and a division over differing perceptions of secularism between eastern and western regions.

The AK Party, still justly claiming to be the party of the entire society, has displayed signs of crumbling and implosion as a result of this phenomenon. Despite the lack of a credible and attractive opposition and particularly because of the worsening economic crisis, the ruling party stands before a historic choice in designing its course, but the question many observers ask is whether its leadership has been able to grasp the gravity of the new situation that has emerged.

Mainly because of delayed measures in dealing with economy, but also due to the apparent administrative mismanagement of the Ergenekon case, the AK Party is to suffer further losses amongst the increasingly confused middle class and mobilize the educated "pro-status quo" -- some would even say "reactionary" -- elite. This type of social buildup is doomed to again leave Turkey hostage in the hands of its demons: intolerance, rifts, enmity, ignorant maximalism and, in the end, unsolvable political knots tying its hands, feet and mind.

Without a doubt, Erdoğan has given this thought during his brief reclusion after the elections. Yet despite the axiom of indecisiveness being worse than anything else, he is waiting. He has not communicated with the public nor has he given hints about what he aims to do.

Expectations of a reshuffle are unchanged. Few people have any idea about the pledged leap of reforms -- constitutional packages and other major laws -- in Parliament. One desperately seeks focus on these areas.

Two matters of foreign policy are of the utmost importance: Turkish-Armenian "normalization" and the Kurdish issue, which is linked with Iraq. Both issues have hit the wall.

Although parties had reached a fundamental agreement on the steps to be taken to normalize relations and declare a historic accord between Yerevan and Ankara, the element of Nagorno-Karabakh was inserted during the last stage by Erdoğan and Ali Babacan, a move which led to a domestic row inclusive of the most hawkish segments of society, using harsh nationalistic language. The AK Party has been unable to control this debate because it has also displayed a profound internal division over the matter in question. The "normalization" process is now in peril.

In the relative silence of Erdoğan, the top commander, too, has entered the stage, and in a lengthy, quasi-academic speech, he reaffirmed the military's tutelage over politics and declared a firm stance in denying the political reality of having to deal with the Kurds through bold reforms. The speech seemed to be in synch with the wave of arrests in the political wing of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the leaders and members of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), and the backlash was an indefinite postponement of the pan-Kurdish conference in Arbil, whose goal was to have the PKK lay down its arms. The messages of the military, paired with the silence of the government, foretell yet another bloody year with human losses and terror.

The Ergenekon case, whose significance for the stability of democracy is without any precedent, is also in disorder. The last wave of arrests, the 12th operation, caused a furor, even among those who until now had approached the case with confidence. The problem, now, is not the content, but the way the prosecutors (do not) communicate the public. The prosecutor's office has refused to appear before the media and respond to questions -- most of them justified -- about the rationale, goals and search and arrest procedures. The longer this non-transparent attitude goes on, the more swift the implosion of the case will be, because the vacuum the lack of accountability creates is filled by people -- even ministers -- who defend or accuse Ergenekon in a self-assured manner. This is horrible.