People of the state

In the meantime though, Turkey is also a "liberal democracy." In other words, a regime which takes as its basic foundation the idea that individual choices and preferences will resound in democratic elections, which will in turn determine who is to run the country, and that the government will emerge from Parliament, will have authority in all arenas and will be overseen by Parliament and the justice systems themselves. But the fact is, this system we call "liberal democracy" is in direct and open conflict with the "spirit" of our Constitution, and what's more, this conflict is not of the sort that can simply be eliminated through reforms. Thus emerges the quite schizophrenic situation we have now. One of the phrases that best reflects this schizophrenia is in that same preamble mentioned above: The text talks of "the indivisible unity of the nation and the people of the state," sticking this mentality right at the very center of the Constitution. To put it briefly: In Turkey, the state comes, in an ontological sense, before the people and the nation, and what's more, is defined as the "owner" of the former.

Interestingly though, we have before us no one person or institution with ideas, emotions or dreams that also carries the name of the "state." But the regime is able to continue forward with the characteristics particular to it and it alone because of the authority held by some people and institutions to think and act in the "name of the state." The authority to think and act in the "name of the state" derives from outside Parliament's sphere of influence and is therefore not controllable. The critical question is whether or not this situation has arisen due to various historical reasons, or whether it is a purposeful choice and type of politics that has been chosen. If it is the first of these, certain legal reforms or the creation of a new constitution could perhaps solve the matter.

  More than simply trying to find a speedy answer to this question, let's take a look at the most recent and deepest running attempt to act in the name of the state: Ergenekon. The most recent documents to surface in connection with the Ergenekon organization proffer up findings in two different arenas: The first arena is Ergenekon's attempts to manipulate election results in Cyprus, and its operations aimed at stoking the fires of separationism. The second arena is the murders of an Iranian politician (and his wife) who opposed the extradition of Abdullah Öcalan to Turkey, as well as the murder of a Russian journalist.   

These recently surfaced documents also define the arena of activity for the "deep state" in Turkey. It is now clear that Ergenekon operations outside of Turkish borders took place with some cooperation from other countries' "deep state" mechanisms. Not only are we talking here about a certain subcontracting service, but also about the various activities falling in lockstep with the state's official ideology. The case of Ergenekon in Cyprus, however, is not a case of subcontracting, but of directing and ordering the state of affairs there. It is not difficult at all to follow the trail of ties between Ergenekon and the provocationist and leader of the separationist movement in Cyprus, the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) and Special Warfare Department (otherwise known as the "Turkish Gladio").

Almost every single active duty officer on trial today for crimes related to Ergenekon has passed through either Cyprus or southeastern Anatolia and the people behind the activities in these regions are seen and presented to us as "national constituents."

The fact that one section of the state bureaucracy has managed to turn itself into a "national element" not only effectively separates the state from the government, but also turns the state wing into the "real" owner of the nation. And what this in turn indicates is a type of nationalism separate from the people of the nation -- when in fact, in order to make any of this business even legitimate, it needs to be carried out in the "name of the people." The solution, then? Quite simple: In Turkey we have not a "state belonging to the people," but instead a "people belonging to the state."

There is a clear tie that binds the reference in our Constitution to the "people of the state" to the ideological legitimacy of the "Turkish Gladio" and Ergenekon.  There is an equivalent in terms of political power to the phrase "the people of the state," and this equivalent has been used ever since the formation of the republic by the same bureaucratic class. The concept of the "state" is actually an expression of these classes' privileges over society at large.