Turmoil in the neighborhood

As Turkey and Armenia move closer to mending fences, Azerbaijan is having a hard time dealing with the thaw that is under way and is even reported to be setting conditions that will need to be met before, for example, the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border -- namely Armenian withdrawal from a number of occupied Azerbaijani districts that surround Nagorno-Karabakh, including part of Lachin, the strategically crucial land corridor that links Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. Perhaps I am too skeptical, but I doubt whether such a bilateral deal could be struck as Armenia would require strong security guarantees given that Azerbaijan could use such a development as an opportunity to try and reclaim Karabakh, as well as the other occupied territories. Thus, renewed warfare could break out in the Caucasus with horrific consequences. Armenia views Russia as its best security guarantee and given Russia's close ties with Yerevan, it would seem no such withdrawal could take place without Russian involvement, approval and boots on the ground (something that Azerbaijan has always been opposed to). But, of course, this is something that Turkey and Russia could work out together, which would leave Baku in something of a tight spot. Furthermore, even given the strong brotherly love between Azerbaijan and Turkey, I doubt whether Ankara would allow Baku to dictate Turkey's foreign policy interests. At the end of the day, Turkey is too important to Baku, and Azerbaijan will therefore have to live with whatever choices Turkey decides to make.

In Georgia, President Saakashvili is hanging on by his fingernails, determined to remain in power and continuing to refuse to acknowledge the role he played in last August's Russia-Georgia war. When he came to power in 2003 he was seen as a man of integrity; these days he is anything but that. It is well known that the Kremlin cannot wait to see him go, but there are also a number of Western leaders who will be happy to see that, too. The West's golden boy has certainly lost his shine. Although it is clear that whoever leads Georgia, Euro-Atlantic integration will remain on the agenda, it needs to be balanced with the realistic acknowledgement that Georgia must have a pragmatic relationship with Moscow and not charge like a bull in a china shop into confrontation after confrontation with the Kremlin. Not surprisingly, Saakashvili has kept a low profile throughout these demonstrations, which have seen around 60,000 people take to the streets but have not so far seen any violence, unlike the protests of November 2007, when Saakashvili used military and other means to break up protests with terrible consequences. Although the opposition, which is made up of between 14 and 17 parties, is better organized than it has ever been in the past, it has no clear plan as to what it will do once it has succeeded in removing Saakashvili. Therefore, they need to get their act together and think further ahead, including carrying out a meaningful face-to-face dialogue with the government to sort out problems. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how they are going to succeed.