Nominating and securing the election of a top international official requires a lot of backroom diplomacy, mastery of the intricacies of the antechamber and, most of all, the fielding of a suitable candidate. Every international organization has, of course, other important positions on offer should the top spot be taken by a competitor -- a deputy secretary-general or a member of the executive body, for example. There is always leeway to negotiate not only before, but during the event, by using one's mobile phone and face-to-face meetings inside and outside the conference room.
One way to analyze NATO's 60th anniversary is to focus on the fact that Turkey agreed to Anders Fogh Rasmussen becoming NATO's next secretary-general. Apparently a deal was brokered at the very last minute that made Turkey vote in favor of him in return for a newly created and prestigious deputy secretary-general position within Rasmussen's new administration. Securing a deputy secretary-general position very often paves the way for nominating a future secretary-general yourself by claiming experience and topical insight and, of course, by exerting influence from within the organization. NATO is based in Brussels and the Belgian capital is complicated diplomatic terrain. Being part of NATO means you are in proximity to the European Union and thousands of active lobbyists, too. You have to be here to lobby effectively, as lobbying by e-mail does not work. Turkey has won a unique opportunity to become more influential within NATO's core administration rather than being only one of the 28 countries that constitute NATO's recently increased membership.
So all's well that ends well after NATO's 60th birthday splash in Strasbourg? Not as far as I am concerned!
Another way of commenting on Mr. Rasmussen is to say that he is not necessarily regarded as someone who fully understands and embraces the cultural and religious concerns of the Muslim world. At a time when the Cold War is nothing but a historic detail, NATO is looking for a new identity because its prime raison d'être no longer exists. What can NATO achieve besides keeping a watchful eye on the status quo, which in today's Western and (most of) Central Europe symbolizes lasting peace? New threats are perceived as imminent and as the political geography has changed, so have the aggressors and potential enemies. In times like these NATO would be well advised to nominate as secretary-generals career diplomats who understand all 28 members' viewpoints. So diversity is an asset, but not under all circumstances: If NATO had proposed a French candidate who was an outspoken anti-German, Berlin would have said, "Nein." If NATO had suggested a Canadian who wanted to break up ties with the US both politically and militarily, Washington would have said, "No." So when NATO opted for Mr. Rasmussen, it was logical that Ankara said, "Hayır!" This was not a repeated "one minute" scenario, but a well thought-out strategy. Why was this so? And are the objections relevant from a Turkish, European or organizational perspective?
As Moscow is no longer the address where you direct your missiles in the event of conflict, Afghanistan and other Muslim nations have become the focus of NATO's attention. Since most of today's terrorists are trained in either Afghanistan or Pakistan before embarking on their deadly missions, NATO, which includes Turkey, must prevent the situation from getting out of control. Sending troops to Kabul and beyond is one such measure. However, a future secretary-general must understand that this creates problems for Ankara in convincing its electorate. I know we have to put this into perspective: When the Allies fought Hitler's Germany, both were of Christian faith fighting against each other. The emerging post-war North Atlantic alliance was not based on faith, but on common values: peace and stability and protecting members against outside aggressors. Faith is not included in NATO's deck of cards.
Ankara acted very wisely and respectably in representing other democratic Muslim states, besides itself, in criticizing Mr. Rasmussen's handling of the cartoon crisis and addressing how TV stations can, but had better not, operate within and from Denmark.
So was it clever diplomacy or an ill-fated balancing act shortly before Barack Obama's historic visit to Ankara and İstanbul? Only time will tell.
What struck me personally as poorly timed was the fact that a majority of NATO members overlooked Turkey's concerns and the worries of the wider Muslim world. I wonder whether there was not a single alternative candidate on the horizon who could be as hawkish as anyone else but more used to dealing with different cultures and their concerns? NATO must urgently adapt to the changing political and geopolitical landscape, to which Turkey holds many keys. In this context, the comments attributed to Olli Rehn, Angela Merkel or Bernard Kouchner criticizing Turkey for objecting to Mr. Rasmussen are not helpful at all. NATO is NATO and the EU is the EU. The three European politicians mentioned here did not hit the right note.
