"The Caucasus can be a wall or a gate. Everyone should do their utmost to turn it into a gate," was the message, in essence, of Turkish President Abdullah Gül to the third parties involved -- particularly to Obama and Ilham Aliyev, president of Azerbaijan.Two years of mainly secret talks in a third country, combined with the thaw due to the soccer diplomacy last year, had led to unprecedented optimism in Turkey. It is known that the two countries have come a long way, and there is an agreement, broadly, on all the bilateral issues to initiate normalization. Perhaps nobody, therefore, had foreseen that rapprochement would again be stuck on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
Is it again back to square one? Not really. Both Turkey and Armenia see that the path taken is the reasonable one, and it would have dire consequences for politics, the economy and energy if stalled. But, some serious work is necessary to overcome the obstacles stemming from Azerbaijani-Armenian relations.
It is known at this stage that Baku is not angry or cross, but "heartbroken" about the process of normalization between its "cousin" Turkey and its "enemy" Armenia. Aliyev chose to not come, therefore, to the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Forum, despite the efforts by both the Turks and Americans. He sent his daughter instead. The absence of Aliyev led to intense telephone traffic, involving both parties and the Americans. All of this has helped to ease the tension, but just a little.
Turkey has kept Azerbaijan constantly informed during the two years of talks with Armenia. In that sense, it would be fair to be critical of Baku on two points. Azerbaijan's leadership has not been able to properly communicate the domestic opinion about the sensitive issue, raising suspicions and encouraging opposition. Secondly, the diplomacy of Azerbaijan does underestimate the experience and skills of the Turkish foreign ministry. It is well known that an able team in Ankara is employed to deal with the negotiations; the sheer choice of such people means that Ankara means business and aims at delivery. Baku's limited scope of foreign diplomacy apparently chose not to trust the envisioned Turkish line, fearing a "sell-out." Ankara argues, instead, that the normalization of relations with Yerevan will make it much easier for Turkey to be involved in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
Aliyev must work harder to tell his people openly, with clear arguments, what is really going on; the Baku-Ankara line must be kept busy to avoid misunderstanding, unease and provocation.
On the home front, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has run into trouble. It is because the opposition (a "united" Nationalist Movement Party [MHP] and Republican People's Party [CHP] on this issue), which reverted to its usual pre-election mode of constant confrontation, has harshly challenged the intentions of opening the border. Apparently very unhappy with Obama's message given in Parliament, deputies of the opposition with diplomacy as their background even tried to hijack a "counter-statement" to Obama in the foreign policy commission of Parliament, but were averted by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) chairman.
Feeling the pressure rising, Erdoğan has repeated the message that he gave to Obama once more: It will be difficult to move ahead unless the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is resolved.
This means that the expected timetable for declaring the steps of normalization has received a minor blow; any prospective declaration is now delayed until after April 24, a critical date for Ankara, because it is still unknown whether Obama will call the tragic events of 1915 a "genocide." The president made it clear while in Ankara that his "pro-genocide" stance remained unchanged. In "waiting," Ankara will expect to have "secured" that the "g-word" will not be used. If used, it would be fair to expect a severing of ties between Turkey and the US.
Yet, Erdoğan's statement does not mean that all the efforts of diplomacy will be in vain. Both Ankara and Yerevan are aware of the fact that turning the southern Caucasus into a gate will mean a huge positive step for the stability of the region and for energy policies and it will open a new phase between the two societies to discuss all of the issues of common interest more directly, in order to face the demons of the past.
Nagorno-Karabakh or not, simply, it is up to the politicians now. Erdoğan stands before a landmark decision. He must make sure that Aliyev is won over to the Turkish side, because the international community is always behind those leaderships that act boldly at this stage. The more Erdoğan waits, the farther away the momentum will be. This is what his opposition wants: a leader, scarred by the election, fading before international politics.
