Our situation reminds me of the following tale: A man visits a psychiatrist, complaining that all the roosters outside want to devour him because he is a grain of corn. The psychiatrist decides the simplest solution is to convince the man that he is not a grain of corn and so he will not be devoured by roosters. Thinking that there is no longer any danger of being eaten, the man happily leaves the psychiatrist's office. But he quickly rushes back and asks anxiously: "OK, I know that I am no longer a grain of corn. But do the roosters outside know that? How am I going to convince them that I am no longer a grain of corn?"It is well known that the Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress were characterized by a revolutionary mentality before and during the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. That mentality did not triumph because of its proponents' inexperience and disastrous political moves. All this put an enormous burden on the state and people, emotionally, politically and financially. Academics maintain that the assassinations and executions during the establishment of the first Grand Assembly, the Independence Tribunals and the Maintenance of Order Law embedded a very particular mentality among those who assumed rule over the public and the republic. Moreover, recognizing that a Marxist-Leninist or Maoist revolution would never be realized in modern Turkey, the revolutionary leftists infiltrated the state and military ranks in the guise of defenders of Kemalism and republicanism and protectors of the system.
In the 1950 elections, when the Republican People's Party (CHP) single-party dictatorship had to hand over power to an elected democratic government, the top army officers offered to stage a coup d'état and keep İsmet İnönü in power. İnönü declined then for fear of international interference, but did not stop a similar attempt in 1960.
Democratization had by then marginalized those who had become accustomed to playing a leading, authoritarian role. A number of officers came together within the armed forces as an oppositional movement against the elected government, and they incorporated revolutionary ideology into the training of cadets and junior officers. From 1955 onward, those officers began to noticeably conspire against the government. In 1960, under their top officers' direction, cadets from the military academy staged a protest march against the government in solidarity with the oppositional student movement, flagrantly manifesting opposition to the democratically elected civilian authorities.
The 1960 military coup also revealed factions within the military. There were fascists, communists and other communitarian radicals who advocated fundamental political and social change, favored maintaining indefinite military rule in order to direct it from above and envisioned a nonparty nationalist populism in the mold of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt (Interestingly, we heard the same again in 2007). The 1961 constitution restructured the Turkish government and institutions in such a way that it caused the political system to fail.
Therefore, in 1971 the military seized control of the state again. This was a sad repetition of the events of 1961 and the same themes recurred in their discourse to justify their consolidation of power. The generals said they had acted to prevent another coup by junior officers rather than because they had a specific program to lead the country out of its difficulties. Blaming the political parties for the "crisis," they "selected a government" that would implement the reforms of the 1961 coup constitution.
In 1980, under coup leader Gen. Kenan Evren, the country was passing through a crisis, and separatist forces and enemies, within and without, threatened its integrity. The military believed Kemalism had been forgotten and the country had been left leaderless, so the junta would correct this and provide national leadership.
In 1997 the generals who were members of the National Security Council (MGK) released a public statement declaring that "destructive and separatist groups are seeking to weaken our democracy and legal system by blurring the distinction between the secular and the anti-secular." So they came back again in a "post-modern coup," ordering the politicians to either implement their proposed measures or fashion an alternative government that would do so.
In 2007 we heard the same from Gen. İsmail Karadayı, a former chief of general staff. Arguing for a new military coup with other conspirators, he asserted: "Democracy in Turkey must remain under the tutelage and guardianship of their military junta for 25-30 years. The people, the constituency, cannot be trusted with electing the president. Selecting the president by the people's common vote is extraordinarily dangerous. People are ignorant."
The coup planners and their helpers do not recognize that there may be a variety of models of social organization that could serve as a platform for Turkish society and interests in particular, and for global society and humanity in general. Also, they cannot see the extent to which internal motivations and desires, not just political and external pressures, lead people. Clearly the protectionist elitists, in collaboration with vested interest groups, have polarized society and increased societal tension and unrest and caused delusions in the broader society.
At this turning point, no doubt, ordinary citizens will engage with convincing arguments, education, consolidation of democratic culture and institutions, respect for human rights and freedoms and further constitutional amendments -- or with a new constitution. Most citizens can believe that they are no longer a grain of corn to be devoured by roosters, but how are we going to convince coup-loving roosters that the Turkish people are no longer a piece of grain to be devoured?
