It has done this by setting rules on how it and those who are not like it should be defined. Therefore the quest for "creating an East in the image of the West," that we call Orientalism, is an intrinsic character of modernism.This perspective has also been intertwined with positivism. By placing the West at the top of the scale of civilizations, the future of Eastern societies has been restricted to being like the West. Today many people who regard themselves as scientifically "enlightened" are still unconsciously keeping track of this hidden positivist and Orientalist approach. These people can be encountered not only in the West, but also in Turkey. Their common denominator is that they deem secularism to be the foremost criterion of civilization. However, they avoid pondering the different forms of this thing they called secularism. They opt for turning a blind eye to the fact that secularism relies on a certain mentality and that different mentalities produce different strands of secularism.
They also feed on an authoritarian mentality which is the positivist and Orientalist type of modernism. Consequently, this mentality is considerably decisive in how those who tend to make a political and cultural identity out of secularism view the "East." In this respect, Turkey never ceases to surprise. Many people do not know how the phenomenon of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) should be handled. This is because they believe that freedom, equality and similar ideals can only blossom in secularizing societies. Accordingly, they see only two roads for Eastern societies: either to become secularized and be like the West, thereby establishing a more liberal regime, or to become religious and be unlike the West, thereby being buried in the "darkness of the Middle Ages." In other words, according to this modernist perception, a person or group has no alternative such as being modernized by preserving their religious identity. However, this is how the West has produced modernity by ensuring its devout people live inside secularism. It seems that for some moderns, it is not appropriate to expect the East to do what the West has done. The only justification for this expectation, it seems, should be the difference between the religions [of the West and of the East]. This justification can be summed up as follows: Many people with a "secular" identity, including those in Turkey, believe that Christianity is prone to modernity, while Islam cannot be compromised with modernity. The well-known argument is that Christianity was reformed. But there is nothing at hand to tell us that reform is a prerequisite with respect to secularization. That this was how it happened in the West does not mean that it must happen in the same way in the East 500 years later. But positivism has the power to drag so many people to ignorance without them being aware of it.
However, what currently happens in Turkey is this unexpected process. A political movement dominated by religious people is currently creating a more liberal and equal country. Yet, the real driving force is not this political party, but the change that is going on within the social strata. I must confess that this is a complicated process. There are many people who call themselves devout on a personal level but live their daily lives in a secular manner. Also there is a tendency not to raise objections to the criteria set by the religious communities in cities and towns of Anatolia where these communities are strong. For example, the number of restaurants where alcoholic drinks are served is decreasing; the public sphere is becoming more and more conservative. But on the other hand, the same people are more liberal and reformist in their political preferences than the secular people.
Thus, cultural conservatism can be merged with political reformism in a way that is hard to be perceived by the Western imagination. The more this conservatism makes its appearance in the public sphere, the larger the community becomes and the more the individuals of this community distance themselves from conservatism in their private lives. This means that conservatism carries and politicizes modernizations including individual secularization. This sentence may be incomprehensible to many, but this is the reality of Turkey.
This dynamism of change is confronted by a group that merges cultural liberalism with political conservatism. This group does not advocate liberal values because it is not based on individualism, but on a sense of community dominated by authoritarian secularism. Therefore we can see more clearly the options before Turkey: On the one hand are the conservatives who carry their religious identity to the public sphere and at same time seek to effect Turkey's EU membership, and on the other hand are the secularists who try to protect their individual lifestyles and the privileges granted them by the state while obstructing liberal reforms.
In the local elections, Turkey will make its choice based on these underlying options. Which side democrats will support has become obvious since the last elections. We know well the consequences of a dominant authoritarian mentality in this country. We are also aware that the Kemalist mentality that ignores the rest of society and even sees society as a threat to maintaining their cultural identity and customs will never make us modern or secular. This is not a matter of liking or disliking the AK Party, but of deciding on what sort of Turkey we want.
