For the first time it seems that the Turkish side is ready to take bold and imaginative measures. The introduction of a Kurdish TV channel and plans for Kurdish radio broadcasting are symbolic moves recognizing Kurdish identity on the part of the state. It is clear that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government is taking a step-by-step approach toward the Kurdish question. It may look cautious and limited, but such an approach is deemed necessary to avoid alienating the rest of the population in Turkey. The post-election period may, however, be a more fruitful time for greater openings.
Moreover, the security establishment, which has long been the determiner of Turkey's Kurdish policy, is now inclined to go along governmental initiatives. Turkey is moving to tackle the Kurdish question in the political realm instead of referring it to the security establishment. In a way, it can be said that Turkey is preparing itself for a post-Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) era in the Kurdish question.
This squarely overlaps with the needs and new perspectives of regional and global actors. It is clear that the PKK's presence as an armed organization is irritating all actors who have a stake in regional stability, peace and cooperation.
For the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq, the PKK is an irritant. With its terrorist activities against Turkish targets, the PKK constantly provokes Turkish military incursions into Iraqi territory that put Kurdish claims of being the authority in the north into question. The PKK does not care about the Kurdish political entity. The reason is very understandable. While the Barzani and Talabani movements in Iraq have succeeded in their objectives, the PKK has failed. Jalal Talabani is the president of Iraq and Massoud Barzani is the leader of the Kurdish administration in the north, while PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan is sitting in a Turkish prison.
So, while the Barzani and Talabani movements are satisfied with what they have got, the PKK is experiencing a great disappointment. This puts enormous stress on the PKK and leads it to an uncompromising position. Yet the Iraqi Kurds are becoming increasingly aware that in order to avoid the "Turkish threat" and establish a working relationship with Turkey, which will be particularly needed after the withdrawal of the US from Iraq, they have to get rid of the PKK in their territories.
Iraqi Kurds are thus not prepared to sacrifice their achievements to the PKK's survival in the name of Kurdish solidarity. The Kurds in Iraq have a lot at stake.
So they are calling on the PKK to stop using violence as a strategy to achieve their political objectives. Talabani said in İstanbul last week, "The age of using violence to achieve political objectives has passed." He also declared that the planned Kurdish conference to be held in Arbil at the end of April will call for the disarmament of the PKK. Whether the PKK joins in the conference or not, such a demand from the Kurdish actors in the region will certainly have an impact on the PKK.
Furthermore, the US administration is clearly interested in the liquidation of the PKK, which threatens stability in the region. As the US is planning to withdraw from Iraq, they do not want to leave the PKK as a source of instability. So the call for the PKK's disarmament from Kurdish elements is backed by the US as well.
The US, under its new leadership, wants to improve relations with Turkey. It seems that the need to cooperate with Turkey on policies related to Iran, Syria and Palestine is pushing the US administration to repair the strategic relationship with Turkey, which requires elimination of the PKK. So long as the PKK remains as an armed organization in the Iraqi Kurdish region, Turkish-American relations can never be stabilized, as Turkey will be pulled into northern Iraq and the US will find itself needing to back the Iraqi Kurds.
So the US also wants to get rid of the PKK irritant to reach Turkey.
Moreover everybody, including Turkey, wants to see a legal political actor to talk to. This is certainly not the PKK, but the Democratic Society Party (DTP). Yet so long as the PKK remains as an armed power it will be impossible for the DTP to act as an independent actor. The liquidation of the PKK will, therefore, serve to strengthening the organizational independence of the DTP from the PKK.
In short, all actors in the region are prepared for a post-PKK era to address the Kurdish question. The PKK is at a crossroads: It will either lay down its arms and transform itself, or be liquidated by force.
