This dynamic from below took the Erbakan movement to a new dimension and a conservative party seeking EU membership for Turkey to power. This is an ideological shock that made the ability to maintain internal integrity of the secular circles impossible; this eventually led to the creation of a new coalition of voters whose impact on the election became visible. However, there are other political lines in Turkey. One of these is represented, of course, by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is currently third in the party ranking. It is possible to imagine this party in relation to a triangle that expands and shrinks all the time. The state occupies one of the corners of this triangle. The nationalist tradition has always considered itself attached to the state and aligned itself with the state's position; this tradition has created parties whose goal was to strengthen the state. However, this natural alliance was harmed by the aggressive stance of the state vis-à-vis this tradition in the aftermath of the Sept. 12 military coup. In the new phase, leaders of this tradition sought to base their political standing on locality, the second corner of the triangle. Attention to locality is important to understand why the MHP works to distance itself from the ultra-nationalists and to promote democracy over military coups.
Even though the MHP tradition reduced nationalism to a cliché, it has paid utmost attention to staying within authentic social values during the socialization of politics. Meanwhile, this locality mostly pointed to religiosity and considering the background of Islam in this country, religiosity was more real than Turkish identity. For this reason, the MHP's attention to locality also helped it make progress. The goal was to combine Islam and Turkish identity and create a new discourse. This has never been achieved but it gave the nationalist movement sensitivity to local values. The last corner of the triangle is politics of violence. Most of the time, members of the MHP tradition matured within violence; they made a career out of it. We all know that this movement brought a number of murderers and criminals to Parliament. However, the MHP now embraces a pretty different line in this respect. It seems eager to stay away from violence.
The older form of the nationalist movement has created political parties that were seeking to survive by relying on state-based politics of violence and an ambiguous relation with locality. The Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) rise to power made this ambiguous relation to the locality even more fragile. There is some sort of nationalism ready to acknowledge domination of the AK Party even in its strongholds. This should normally drag the MHP to the other corners of the triangle, but this did not happen. Thanks to the changing outlook of the support base and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli's responsible actions, the MHP has become a party that is not less pro-state and does not promote violence.
This is a pretty delicate balance because it has to deal with a rival nationalism, pro-secular nationalism. Therefore, we are talking about a political party stuck between religious conservatism and ultra-nationalism. This refers to the MHP's marginalization and loss of popularity. However, the party administration still does not change its overall strategy because I think they rely on a pretty accurate analysis of Turkey. This country will be more embracing of democracy and experience a pluralistic form of society. The first reality that this implies is that parties like the Republican People's Party (CHP), which try to resist change and the transformation process, will become outdated. Secondly, it is obvious that such a fluid and indecisive society will not be represented by the AK Party alone.
Therefore, it is possible to reference the two major strategic stances for the MHP in this election. First, the MHP's actual rival is the CHP. The MHP indicates that it will be able to serve as a main opposition party. They will be an opposition party that will review the EU reforms through a nationalist perspective, support the Ergenekon investigation and oppose military guardianship over civilian politics. However, this opportunity also requires the preservation of the existing support base and closing the gap with the CHP. For this reason, those who expect that the MHP support base will vote for the CHP candidates in some crucial districts will be disappointed.
More interestingly, the AK Party's growth will be beneficial for the MHP because the AK Party will not be able to keep the support of such a large number of voters for a long time. In politics that will be normalized after the elimination of the military guardianship, the AK Party votes will inevitably decline. There are no big differences between the MHP base and the AK Party voters; the element of locality will make the MHP a viable alternative for many voters.
The opportunities that the MHP has also give clues as to the voters' behaviors. This party will stand behind its votes; it will be in an advantageous position in the aftermath of the election if the gap between the AK Party and the CHP is widened further.
