They are pluralistic, open to dialogue, cosmopolitan and democratic in countries in which these values have taken root. They are monolithic, conservative, closed to dialogue and anti-democratic when their countries or sociopolitical contexts dictate such values as political norms. Democratization, pluralism, globalization and economic development transform all political actors from right to left, from the secular to the religious. The future of Islamist political parties also depends on what happens in the political economy of the countries and the regions in which they exist and function. As Muslim-majority societies embrace globalization in a multitude of ways, different religious and political identity claims will find their way into the public sphere. Unlike the 20th century, these new identity claims have to compete with others and prove their worth to have a niche in society. It's not enough to convince one's constituency. One has to speak to larger audiences to maintain one's relevance and legitimacy. This means softening the "maximalist" identity claims of the past and competing for political space with arguments that must be intelligible to people outside one's spiritual community and political camp.
There is a political context to all of this, and it is the struggle for power. The old elites, the guardians of the ancien régime, do not want to share power and give up their privileges. Sharing power is difficult and seen by the old guard as a matter of national security. The struggle between the old and the new elites in Turkey is a case in point. Within the political system of many Muslim countries, the struggle between the establishment and the reformists is a battle for power. The establishment could be Islamic or secular and the reformists could be Islamists, nationalists (rarely!) or liberal and secular groups. At any rate, the power struggle is a key component of the current political process in most of the Muslim countries, including Egypt, Turkey, Algeria, Tunisia, Palestine and more recently Malaysia.
In some Muslim-majority countries, opposition to political reform and democratization comes not from the Islamic groups but from the governments that represent the status quo. They are challenged by both Islamic and liberal forces, and this is an important point to underscore. While classical Islamist movements share very little with the main teachings of classical liberalism, neo-Islamists and neo-liberals seem to agree on many issues. Ideas of small government, free-market economy, middle-class culture and pluralism have found resonance among religious social groups that lead the opposition against their oppressive regimes. Through a mixture of religious pragmatism and cautious idealism, they give credit to the liberal model as a way of overcoming oppression. But this very process itself transforms their rigid ideological positions on many key issues.
Likewise, the liberal forces in Muslim-majority countries seem to understand the realities of their societies and pay more attention to their local circumstances. Unlike the ultra-secular and Westernized elites of the 19th and 20th centuries, they do not reject the religious and cultural values of their societies. In fact, there seems to be a growing consensus on the core values of democracy and pluralism with Islamic and liberal interpretations.
How do these facts bear upon policy-making? How can the current governments in Muslim countries from the most secular and oppressive to the most liberal and Islamist develop new and creative strategies of engagement? How would they tolerate dissent and enable legitimate political opposition?
Engaging Islamist political actors in times of normalcy is important to build up enough political capital to deal with crisis situations. Often people rush to dialogue to address a crisis situation but do not have enough of a track record to deal with new crises. The current relations between various Islamic political groups and Western governments are paralyzed by a deep sense of mistrust and suspicion. Building trust and confidence through diverse channels is key to the development of healthy and sustainable relations. Muslim audiences expect their Western counterparts to show respect in their relations with the Muslim world. It is important to recognize and cultivate cultural and religious sensitivities and make them an integral part of the political discourse of Islam-West relations.
An important and concrete step to be taken here is to ensure free and fair elections in Muslim countries and respect their results. All actors ought to be coherent in their defense of democracy and democratic elections in Muslim countries. As a recent letter to US President Barack Obama indicated, the best way to support democracy in the Muslim world is to remove the barriers before it.
Likewise, the Islamic political parties would have to improve their democratic and pluralistic credentials in order to claim a legitimate space in national and international politics. This means, among other things, overcoming the rigid and largely dysfunctional antagonisms of us versus them, Muslim versus non-Muslim, Arab versus non-Arab and the Islamic world versus the West. Instead, the principles of justice, equality and reciprocity should be the guiding principle of all politics and social activism.
