And normalization means overcoming the ethnic-sectarian tendencies that have overrun Iraqi politics since the US invasion in 2003.
First things first. The fact that the Iraqi provincial elections were held by the Iraqis themselves without violence or major irregularities is a victory for all Iraqis. After years of death, destruction and political turmoil, the Iraqis are beginning to see themselves as the primary actors in their country. The 51 percent voter turnout is no small matter and shows the willingness of the Iraqis to participate in the political process. This time, a majority of the Sunnis also took part in the elections. This is important because the Sunnis are the main Iraqi group that has felt isolated and disempowered since the US invasion. Their participation in the elections is a good sign for the normalization of Iraqi politics.
According to the results so far, the clear winner of the election is Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who won in nine of Iraq's 14 provinces. Maliki's call for reinforcing the Baghdad central government has apparently resonated well with the majority of those who participated in the elections. Maliki's call for the "rule of law" is also a call for shifting the center of Iraqi politics from the fiercely independent southern and northern provinces back to Baghdad.
The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), under Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, in the south and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), under Massoud Barzani, in the north suffered considerable losses. Their appeal for more autonomy has not found much support in multiethnic and multisectarian cities and provinces. This was clearly born out in Mosul, where the Sunnis had a decisive victory over the Kurdish list. In Baghdad, too, the centrist argument has come out victorious.
Yet there are a number of challenges awaiting Prime Minister Maliki. His calls for stronger government in Baghdad are likely to lead to a major confrontation between him and Barzani on three key issues: bringing all oil agreements under Baghdad's authority, dissolving the peshmerga army and making it part of the Iraqi national army and, finally, giving a special status to the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. None of these issues will be easy to deal with, as Mr. Barzani will resist any change to the current status-quo of his rule in the north. While this may seem like a loss in the short term, it is a win for all Iraqis in the long run.
A stronger Baghdad is good for all Iraqis. It is good for Iraq's neighbors, including Turkey, too. There is not a single country around Iraq that would approve of the division of Iraq into two or three states. The only way to keep Iraq together both territorially and politically is to reinvigorate the sense of being one nation under one banner. The Iraqi flag becomes fake when the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south see themselves as above or outside Iraq's national unity.
A stronger Baghdad is also good for Turkey's relations with the Iraqi Kurds. Until last year, Turkey refused to talk to Arbil directly for two reasons: the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) issue and the fear that a direct line of communication with Arbil would mean bypassing and thus weakening the central government in Baghdad. Turkey has been following the same policy line toward the Iraqi Turkmen. While there is a special relationship between Turkey and the Turkmen in Iraq, they are first Iraqi citizens and then Turkey's special friends.
If the results of the provincial elections are any indication, a major shift toward overcoming ethnic-sectarian politics is taking place in Iraq. This, too, will make it easier for Turkey to talk to the Iraqi Kurds directly, because it will not be seen as a threat either by Baghdad or by the Iraqi Turkmen. Turkey needs to further open up to northern Iraq and strengthen its political, economic and cultural ties with the Iraqi Kurds. If managed carefully, this will help Turkey improve its record on the Kurdish issue while embracing the Iraqi Kurds as part of Turkey's natural human and cultural geography.
