Yet as Babacan also mentioned, the way that France will return to the military flank of the alliance has not been clarified. In other words, France has neither made a formal request to rejoin NATO's integrated military structure nor has the NATO secretariat clarified from a legal point of view whether Paris' return will be automatic or will require a unanimous vote, something that will also necessitate Turkish approval.
Raising their views concerning France's possible return to NATO's integrated military structure, Turkish political opposition parties have suggested that Ankara only vote yes if France ensures the lifting of its opposition to the opening of eight chapters with Turkey as part of its accession talks with the European Union.
In addition, opposition parties have urged Ankara to also use its veto -- if it gets the chance to use it -- to ensure that Turkey does not fall into the same trap it fell into when retired Gen. Kenan Evren, the junta leader-turned-president, agreed to the return of Greece to NATO's military command in 1980 in return for nothing.
In other words, it is in the minds of many Turks that Evren made a grave mistake in safeguarding Turkey's national interests by agreeing to a US plan, called the Rogers Plan, which paved the way for Athens to claim responsibility for command and control of the entire Aegean Sea, weakening Turkey's position.
Despite the continuing-though-old mindset of Turks who were forced to swallow a bitter pill at the time as a result of Evren's foreign policy mistake, the current political environment seems unlikely to serve Turkey's interests if it decides to use its veto card to block France's return to NATO. Turkey's rejection of Greek Cypriot participation in joint NATO-EU peacekeeping missions have already complicated the smooth functioning of US-European cooperation in this field, as was the case in the Kosovo mission.
After Kosovo declared independence on Feb. 17, 2008, the 27 EU nations agreed to deploy the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) from mid-2008 to help its transition to a functioning, independent state; however, it has been plagued by delays and troubled by differences between EU member states, not all of whom are willing to recognize Kosovo. The differences between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus have also meant security arrangements about deploying personnel to Kosovo could not be discussed at meetings where not all attendees were members of both NATO and the EU -- which happens whenever Turkey and Greek Cypriots are in attendance, since the former is a member of NATO and not the EU and the latter is the opposite.
After several years of negotiations, Turkey and NATO members, the majority of which are also EU members, signed a declaration in December 2002 on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which enabled the use of NATO assets and capabilities by the EU as part of ESDP operations, known as the "Berlin Plus" arrangement.
This became possible under the Ankara Agreement of 2001, which stipulated that Turkey would automatically participate in EU-led military operations when NATO assets and capabilities are used. At the time of the agreement, the Greek Cypriot administration was not a member of the EU, as it joined in 2004.
As another reflection of the changed political environment, French diplomats recall that Paris has already been contributing to NATO's peacekeeping forces deployed elsewhere in the world, including the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, working closely with Turkish soldiers.
In the meantime, France has not made a formal request to NATO for a return to NATO's military command except that French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared during a summit of the alliance last April that his country has had a desire to rejoin the military arm of the alliance.
A French return to the military structure of NATO could be finalized in April. Meanwhile, as part of wider diplomacy, France has also consulted with Turkey over the issue, and according to reliable Turkish diplomatic sources Ankara has not objected to Paris' decision. Turkish-French consultations will continue to take place, even though the main responsibility over clarifying the way the French return will fall with the NATO secretariat.
Turkey's rejection of France's return to the alliance's military flank may backfire, weakening NATO, the only international organization where Ankara has the power of veto. As Babacan said last Friday, in response to questions over the Turkish position on France's return to NATO's military flank, the continuation of a strong NATO alliance is important. Therefore, it is highly possible that Turkey will not stand in the way of this historic return of a nuclear power to the alliance's military command.
