What is surprising though is that Hamas did not launch the attacks while the Sharon-Abbas meeting was going on, and moreover, the Hamas wing in Gaza announced that "it did not order" the attacks. Gaza political wing leader Mahmoud al-Zahhar, who met with Abbas after the attacks, also surprisingly said that he supports an end to violence and stated that the Syrian wing of the organization ordered the attacks. When the attacks are read through the message of Zahhar, the meaning is: Hamas is experiencing a division within and while the dominant wing in Gaza and the West Bank favors shifting into political struggle and abandoning armed struggle (or at least laying down arms until they can pull themselves together to continue the armed struggle), the leaders of the movement outside Palestine do not accept any other option except the "annihilation of the Zionist enemy by military means. "
Hamas has been the only name in the armed struggle in the Palestinian territories for a long time. Other organizations such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which was formed by al-Fatah as an "alternative" to prevent Hamas from gaining more influence over the grassroot base, as well as the Islamic Jihad and the People's Resistance Committees turned into "dependent" organizations in the face of Hamas' dynamism. With the dynamism it has shown in the armed struggle and its public services performances, Hamas has become a group that will leave its mark on the future of Palestine, because any decision made by this organization has more effect than any pledge made by the Palestinian president.
Of course, the Palestinian administration is aware of its long-term weakness against Hamas, however, Abbas' presidential office requested a meeting in Cairo with the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad living outside, before the Sharm el-Sheikh talks, since it wanted to speak with one voice in any pledge that was to made to Ariel Sharon. On the other side, Abbas, insisting on going it alone, decided he will meet with the leaders of the organizations after his talks with Sharon. This prompted the leader of the traditional political wing of Hamas in Syria, Khalid Mashal, to in deed show off the "I exercise covert control" attitude. If the history of Palestinian organizations is examined, it is obvious that Mashal's action is a type of "take me into consideration" reaction. When Arafat was in exile in Tunisia, his organization continued the armed struggle after they felt they had to taken into consideration in the Oslo Accords. When Mashal's "right to speak" is recognized in terms of the size of his organization, Hamas naturally will support a cease-fire, begin to back the two-state formula and even recognize Israel's right to exist.
Hamas is a party/organization that conducts its politics and struggle with religious motives. Therefore, it is an entity, which is dynamic, open to changes, and prepared to adopt necessary conditions. If "the Palestine-based command," which has lost the slain Sheikh Ahmed Yasin and Adulaziz Rantisi, will be able to fulfill this objective by excluding Mashal, or if Mashal, who has spent most his life in exile in Jordan and Syria, is accorded a grand welcome on his return similar to that of [the late Yasser] Arafat, Hamas might be politicized in a shorter time than al-Fatah did and may control Palestine's future, contrariwise, the future of Palestine will continue to mean struggle and this means that Hamas will speak out again.
February 14, 2005
London
