The rehabilitation of Kirkuk's demographic structure, that has been damaged to certain a point, is a requirement. The protection of the democratic rights of the Sunni Arabs in this amendment is as imperative as Turkey's "Kurdistan" concerns. Kirkuk turning into a fait accompli Kurdish province, providing oil and oil providing an opening to the world, concern Sunni Arabs who are the "elements forced to become minorities" in the region, more than they concern Turkey. As a matter of fact, we also know that Sunni Arabs urged support for Turkmen parties during the elections.
The main reason of an independent Kurdistan being a dream is the reality that a state stuck in between the Iran-Turkey-Syria and "Sunni Arab Triangle" has no hance of surviving. However, it is difficult to close the borders against oil. A "Kurdistan" controlling Kirkuk oil will be in a position to reach the rest of the world much easier.
Kirkuk is not an issue of "more or less one city." Besides, oil does not only mean money.
Along with Kirkuk's significance for Turkey and other regional countries and elements, Ankara also has to be concerned about the other developments in Iraq. The protection of the rights of Sunni Arabs, who have been excluded from the "New Iraq" formation process because they boycotted the elections, should also be Turkey's problem. Furthermore, preventing the Sunni tribes' enthusiasm for resistance against the occupation from turning into a structure that might nourish regional terrorism with time should also be Turkey's problem. Taking measures against the so-called alliance between the occupation's puppet prime minister Iyad Allawi and Massoud Barzani as well as Jalal Talabani, an alliance that will make the [election] winner the prime minister, the first runner-up the Kurdistan president and the second runner-up the Iraqi president… Also keeping Shiite Arabs away from the Iranian revolution line… Also ensuring the recognition of the rights of the Sunni Arabs and Turkmens in the constitution, which will go to a referendum by the end of 2005, and ensuring the approval of this constitution by Sunnis… Meanwhile, saving Turkey from the state image that has ambitions over Kirkuk, should also be Ankara's problem.
For the Sunnis to accept the new Iraqi constitution necessitates ending the occupation immediately and establishing Iraq's unitary state structure. If two-thirds of the "Sunni Triangle" cast "no" votes in the referendum - a condition which indeed had been added to the provisional constitution to protect the rights of the Kurds, but can be used by the Sunni Arabs today - this might disrupt the constitutional process for at least a year and could postpone the normalization process in our southern neighbor.
Daily heroes and leaders flourish mostly in occupied territories. Ahmad Chalabi, who had come to Iraq as a savior within the past year, has been accused of being an Iranian spy… Muqtada al-Sadr, who was said to be the symbolic name of resistance against the occupation was pacified overnight, and has been excluded from both the front and the political processes all of a sudden… The al-Hakim family, which had been exclude d because they were said to have entered the country through Iran's directives in the early days of the occupation, could head the most powerful political group in the country today. Under such variable circumstances, Turkey developing a healthy Iraq policy is very difficult indeed.
For Turkey, the Iraqi occupation has created more problems than expected.
February 7, 2005
London
