History does not have to be fair. A parliament, which is the fruit of occupation and whose legitimacy will always be questioned, will shape Iraq's future. All groups, except Sunnis, will be "represented" more than they deserve in that parliament which will prepare the constitution.
The constitutional process will only determine whether or not Iraqi Sunnis will get what they deserve. Contrary to this, boycotts and bombings will create a permanent potential for struggle between Sunnis and Shiites. If Muqtada al-Sadr, excluded in the elections, does not return to "armed struggle" again, the current picture then would become clear: It had been decided that Shiites and Kurds will have gain the "maximum benefit from the current situation" through their cooperation with the occupation forces and the Sunni Arabs will embark upon an armed struggle in order to change the current situation. However, there might be an exception, observing Friday prayers together as in the period when the resistance was an Iraqi phenomenon, not that of Sunni Arabs, will be very difficult henceforth.
Iraq is on the verge of a serious split along sectarian lines.
An understanding that determines the casting of votes as a sin, something the Shiites claimed to be a merit and sending all the people dying around ballot boxes to hell, no matter who it belongs to, is a Sunni attitude from the Shiite perception. Those Sunnis who declared that Shiites who went to the polls were taking sides with the occupation forces, and hence "traitors," are also obvious. Then, will the struggle that started at the polling station end at the polling station?
No.
Shiites will not hesitate to use their dominance in the new parliament, whose paramount duty is to form a constitution and a government that will deploy all the security forces against the Sunni insurgents. Under such circumstances, put aside Iraq being dragged into a war, it is clear that the Najaf madrasahs, which are the most productive madrasahs in Shiite history, will reflect this emerging opposition. This means that an armed struggle that will cause a stir inside Iraq might create an "intellectual struggle" that will disconcert the entire Islamic world. If the ability of the Najaf Shiites to write in Arabic and easily gain access to intellectual centers in the Arab world is taken into consideration, the possibility of this struggle having long-term and permanent effects is high as well.
Are the Sunni intellectuals ready for this challenge? Will we be able to bear the "imposter" discussions that will be developed by Sistani's approach, obviously based on the "imposter" Shiite Fiqh," which is the "approach of getting on well with the occupiers"? What can Sunni clerics, based on Fiqh, [Islamic jurisprudence], who could not clarify their positions on the issue against the Shiite mullahs, who might easily issue a fatwa of "rejection" on suicide attacks in which they are targeted (while I was writing this article, nine suicide attacks aimed at disrupting the election process took place) say? Is it possible to make these debates on "absolute justice" and "relative justice" and leave the doors of the new Siffin wars ajar?
The Iraqi elections really had historic significance. I predict that the newly established government will shift into the Iranian axis and will not leave many chances for the Anglo-American occupation forces, nevertheless, I am also afraid of the possibility of a relative atmosphere of freedom that will be provided by this government, dragging Iraqi Shiites to an extreme anti-Sunni line. Can Turkish Alevite and Sunni intellectuals play a constructive role in this context? What can I say: O Mohammed (pbuh) help, O Ali (as) help.
January 31, 2005
